Mick Ryan is a retired Australian Army Major General and author of Futura Doctrina on Substack.

Yeah, I think we've seen that already over the last couple of decades.

We've seen media cycles, first with the internet and then with social media.

Media cycles spun up, which then spun up political cycles because they have to respond to it.

So we already have insights with fast decision-making cycles.

AI is going to magnify that.

to a degree that we still probably don't understand but we've seen the impact of ai in the war against iran and also israel has used to speed up the tempo of operations now it doesn't always mean you're making better decisions you certainly can make quicker decisions And the thing we need to be concerned about is if the military is using AI to generate a very rapid tempo, we need to make sure they don't lose touch with the political decision makers.

So actually having a to persuade people that a war, continuing a war, is necessary for an outside power, however sophisticated, like the United States, can be very, very difficult.

He's a leading expert on the future of warfare and has analyzed how developments in the Ukraine war have implications for defense strategists all over the world

Yeah, I think that this has been a, a really important part of the war over the last few years.

A Shahed is around 40 to $60,000, depending on where it's made.

Is it jet propeller? But that, that's the rough quanta that you just outlined there, and we've seen this throughout the war where initially when the Russians were using Shahed drones, you know, the Ukrainians were having to use expensive missiles.

They were then using .50 cal machine guns out of the back of trucks, and they married them to AI.

Um, and now they've developed these drone interceptors about 18 months ago, and it's flipped the equation on the use of drones.

It used to be if you were using drones, you were e-employing a cost imposition strategy against your adversary.

I put the idea that attackers are always at an advantage to Mick Ryan.

I just wondered what your thoughts are on that.

Well, one of the great secrets of military organization is there's always a battle for the soul of any military organization in peace or war.

There's always a struggle between the traditionalists and reformists.

You know, in peace time, there's a bias towards the traditions because there's less money and, frankly, less evidence for why they need to change.

In war, that changes.

And Andrew Gordon's great book, The Rules of the Game, about the lead up and conduct of the Battle of Jutland describes this as regulators and rat catchers.

And, and in war, you need lots of rat catchers.

But Mick Ryan suggests that we should also reflect on the past, both its successes and failures, to help understand a future in which drone warfare will no longer seem an innovation, just another part of the extended modern battlefield.

Even if he got Russia on side, where does that leave China, given what China said in the last 48 hours about the Bessant sanctions? In other words, "They're illegal and we're not playing ball."

Well, China will do what China wants to do, and it's a, it's a much bigger player than Russia and Iran, and it's a much bigger gain for the Americans than, than Russia and Iran combined.

Um, Trump has established a, an uneasy, I guess, um, arrangement with the Chinese, where the Americans won't step up tariffs too much if the Chinese won't retaliate with things like rare earths.

I think both sides would prefer not to upset that current uneasy balance.

But the Chinese have shown now that for the first time in, in decades, they have the capacity to hurt America as much, if not more, than America can hurt them economically, and Trump won't wanna do that at this point in time.

Things are already hard enough in America with inflation.

Uh, another trade war with China would make things worse.

In, once again, in the broadest of senses, who's winning?

Even if he got Russia on side, where does that leave China, given what China's said in the last 48 hours about the Bisson sanctions? In other words, "They're illegal and we're not playing ball."

Well, China will do what China wants to do, and it's a, it's a much bigger player than Russia and Iran, and it's a much bigger gain for the Americans than, than Russia and Iran combined.

Um, Trump has established a, an uneasy, I guess, um, arrangement with the Chinese where the Americans won't step up tariffs too much if the Chinese won't retaliate with things like rare earths.

I think both sides would prefer not to upset that current uneasy balance that the Chinese have shown now that for the first time in, in decades they have the capacity to hurt America as much, if not more, than America can hurt them economically, and Trump won't wanna do that at this point in time.

Things are already hard enough in America with inflation.

Uh, another trade war with China would make things worse.

So China's in a pretty good position here.

In, once again, in the broadest of senses, who's winning?

Um, h- how exactly, uh, do they do that? How does it work?

Well, there's a, a lot of intricate planning that goes into deconflicting, uh, where drones and, and ground forces will be going, deconflicting the electromagnetic spectrum so they're not jamming each other.

But I think a really important development in the last year has been the formation of cores, which are a standing professionalized higher level headquarters that they haven't had in this war until now.

They were st- they were, uh, ad hoc headquarters before now, but each core has multiple brigades, and it's able to use these brigades to shape future operations and then conduct continuous operations by essentially, uh, using a brigade to a certain level, then replacing it with another one to s- sustain, uh, tempo.

So we're seeing these kind of things play out, not just in tactics, but in the organizations that the Ukrainians are using, as well as the mid-range strike offensive over the last couple of months that's really eaten away at Russia's ability to logistically support its front line troops.

Do you agree with that? And what does that tell us about the strategy going forward?

forward?Yeah, the Russians have had a, a slow rolling mobilization program ever since 2022.

Once they sorted out the, uh, the physical and, and the training infrastructure to be able to, uh, increase the throughput of trained soldiers for Russian ground forces, they've been utilizing it.

How, how do you see the role of AI and autonomy, particularly with companies like Skyfall evolving over the next several months? Uh, and what do, what do you expect to see even in areas, Mick, like, um, swarming?

Yeah.

So I think we need to acknowledge a couple things.

Firstly, Ukraine has had a national AI plan since before the start of the full-scale invasion, so they've always been leaning into the application of AI, uh, for a range of functions beyond just military.

But the war has concentrated their efforts, um, and they're using AI from everything from, you know, this, this drone warfare that we're seeing for EW, but also for things like identifying Russians who are war criminals and things like that.

We should also acknowledge that this isn't just a Ukrainian effort.

They've had a huge amount of assistance from foreign companies, in particular American companies.

But what do you think? I mean, fr-from the Australian, from the US side, do you, do you see a lot of Actual learning and that translating into, uh, equipping and, uh, tactics, uh, uh, and other factors

How often are you going over there? And have you seen civilian-military integration? How have you seen examples of what is effectively civilian-slash-startup defense tech engaging directly into military units?

Yeah, I mean, I go there once or twice a year.

I'd love to go more, but I also have to go to other war zones, Israel, the Middle East, try and get there every year if possible.

I also get to Taiwan.

I've just come back from a visit there.

And, you know, there's a remarkable degree of similarity across the three.

There's obviously some geographic, cultural, and other differences there.

What do you make of that? To me, it seems very new and the mechanisms for delivering those messages very new.

And why do you think that is? Is it a lack of interest in governments? Is it a changing part of, of the culture in terms of ou- our attitudes towards the military?

I think there's a few reasons, uh, why that is in Australia.

Never a silver bullet reason.

Um, you know, one of it is that I think, uh, most Australians don't perceive a threat to Australia.

I mean, we're not proximate to China or Russia or North Korea, so they don't see every day the kind of threats and aggression that these countries are engaged in against those neighbors that are, that are much closer.

Uh, second, and related to that, is governments therefore don't see an imperative to invest more in defense.

As we've seen from the latest budget and the National Defense Strategy, defense spending has flat lined at two percent, which is grossly inappropriate and, and inadequate for where we are h- in the twenty-first century.

Back to the Australian context, what are the key capability areas Australia needs to address to stop us from falling behind?

Can you just explain that a little bit? There's a

theme in a lot of analysis about the war that we're in a period of positional war and that that is likely to be the future war.

I think neither are true.

Positional warfare is an element of overall war which always has an uneasy balance of manoeuvre, attrition and positional forms of conflict.

This just happens to be a period where positional is dominant.

Positional warfare is where both sides exist in a kind of stasis where neither can gain any strategic advantage, even though they might be able to gain a short-term tactical advantage, overall strategic and political advantage is evenly or close to evenly balanced, which is kind of where we are.

But we see that in all forms of warfare.

If we're fighting a land war for Australia, then we've already lost, haven't we?

Can you just explain that a little bit?

There's a theme in, um, a lot of analysis about the war that, uh, we're in a period of positional war, uh, and that that is likely to be the future war.

I think neither are true.

Um, positional warfare is an element of overall war, which always has, uh, an uneasy balance of, uh, maneuver, attrition, and positional, uh, forms of conflict.

This just happens to be a period where positional, uh, is dominant.

Positional warfare where is, is where both sides exist in a kind of stasis where neither can gain any strategic advantage.

Even though they might be able to gain a short-term tactical advantage, uh, overall strategic and political advantage is, uh, evenly or, or close to evenly balanced, which is kind of where we are.

I- if we're fighting a land war for Australia, then we've already lost, haven't we?

How would you assess the American performance in this war vis-a-vis Iran?

Well, if I was to start at the top, at the political level, um, you know, within a short period of the first attacks, uh, taking place, uh, there was a statement by the president, um, who did outline the rationale for the attacks on Iran.

Um, and you know, we, you can argue about whether they're right or wrong objectives, if there's too many, not enough.

But clearly, um, making sure Iran didn't have nuclear weapons, that it was no longer a state sponsor of terrorism throughout the Middle East and indeed through the world, I mean, they've sponsored attacks in Australia, um, and regime change were the top of the pile of what were, you know, a lot of other objectives, including destroying the long range and medium range ballistic missile capabilities.

So I mean, there, there was a set of objectives.

Whether they were well explained, uh, to the American people and to allies is, is another issue.

But at least itIt, it-- there were objectives in, in the president of America's mind and, and in his cabinet about why they were launching this.

So that's-- Let me, let me lay that out for you, and then I'm, I'm just curious your take that for as dominant as the American military has been operationally, there are actually some pretty serious warning signs.

Who's learning the right lessons, or is this a problem for-- still a huge problem for Europe?

Yeah.

I think, you know, your original proposition that, um, eighty years of American presence in Europe has led to a welfare state, that, I mean, that's a defensible position.

Although remember the original design was America was there so they wouldn't fight each other and provide a security guarantee.

So we need to remember the original context of how that's happened.

I'm not defending, you know, the fact that, uh, we've all become welfare states.

Um, so I think that's a defensible position.

Do you think the Iran war and the demonstration effect of both Venezuela and Iran is accelerating Xi's plan for Taiwan or delaying it, or is it just impossible to know?

How does something like that actually work?

Yeah, well, those things sit at the upper end and the more expensive end of uncrewed systems, and you, you need some of those, but you also need mid-tier and lower-tier au- autonomous and semi-autonomous systems.

I mean, an autonomous system is essentially something that's launched and has its own guidance, and AI system is able to go about the penetration of enemy s- space to get to its target and complete a mission, whether that target is, uh, intelligence collection target or, or a kinetic kind of target.

Semi-autonomous means there's Austra- uh, there's, uh, humans involved during the conduct and the recovery of the system if it is indeed a recoverable system.

But you have, uh, the cheap and mass systems, which the Ukrainians are building about five million a year of.

These are the small, you know, 500 to a couple thousand dollar systems, both drones and interceptors, which now go out to about 500 kilometers in range.

There's the mid-tier systems.

Does this signal a push for sovereignty capability rather than reliance on overseas platforms? And if so, how important is that in today's context?