Um, Maggie, it's great to have you here at the table.

Thanks.

Um, there's a, um, there's a, a piece where this is, of course, uh, perhaps the least surprising news that we would cover today, but there's a disorienting piece and maybe, um, a sign that some of what Trump has done by branding aggressive investigative coverage of what Russia is doing to the entire United States of America as the Russia hoax, where people might be reluctant to cover this, but this is precisely what Robert Mueller outlined in volume one of his investigation.

You're exactly right about that.

Uh, because he has flooded the zone with Russia, Russia hoax, I can tell you that academics don't study it the way we did after 2016, including here at Stanford.

We're afraid to get involved in it.

Some have been sued for looking at disinformation, for looking at things that are not true in the, in the internet.

Um, and second to that, the s- the techniques have gotten better.

Ambassador, what do you think?

not optimistic at all of a breakthrough on iran uh we did this war we didn't need to do this war we're stuck it's worse than when we started the war i don't see any uh change in that horrible status quo we're in there i think in this bigger question that you're talking about the you know nobody cares about trump uh our reputation around the world has just tanked and i really encourage everybody watching to go to the pew polling data They've been doing data polling about America's reputation in the world for decades.

And around the world, mostly with our allies, we are below water.

Less people like us than they don't like us.

Excuse me, less people support the United States than support the United States by just historic numbers.

I was in Australia last week.

We are at a historic low in Australia.

I don't think that they would think that was something President Obama ever even considered.

Was there that sort of rationalization, Michael?

Well, there was.

So I left the government right before that invasion.

So I was not in the government at the time, but I was most certainly interacting with the government and part of the debate more generally.

I think we should have had a more robust response.

We should have had more sanctions and we should have provided arms to the Ukrainians.

so that they could deter a future intervention, a future invasion, as we saw tragically in 2022.

Is it happening?

What did we learn then? What do we know now about that confrontation that helps us here in the 21st century? Good evening, Professor.

Well, good evening and thanks for having me, John.

Good to see you again.

I think it's a great place to start because it was, in my view, one of the most dangerous, probably the most dangerous moment in the Cold War.

And obviously, we still call it the Cold War historically because it didn't become a hot war between the United States and and the Soviet Union, even though they did fight from time to time proxy wars.

But that was a major crisis because of course it involved nuclear weapons.

And the use of nuclear weapons means complete obliteration of both countries involved and lots of other countries would be affected by it.

Why did he do that and what did we learn from it, Michael?

But again, the argument that I would make is that for NATO as an organization, admitting some of these states did not necessarily improve the security of existing members, and for Europe as a whole, you know, you have to ask yourself, again, this is a counterfactual, would we have rather had a Europe with a major land war in Ukraine with all this, you know, these weapons being spent, these lives being spent in the biggest land war that we've had in Europe basically since World War II, or would we rather have had more of, let's say, a gray zone between Russia and the West, where some of these states perhaps did not have the full freedoms that they might have if they were members of, of NATO, but where, you know, perhaps it would not have been as prone to conflict? And I think, again, it's a, it's an unpleasant counterfactual, but it's one worth making.

And I just disagree with it.

I wanna be clear about it.

The, the, the underlying assumption there in that argument is that NATO expansion caused Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

I j- what basis...

You know, how do we make that argument? The first invasion, first let's go back to 2014, was not about NATO expansion.

NATO expansion died in 2008.

And so I'm curious, I'd be curious to hear you speak to that tension, and also to say, I mean, what did the Russians themselves think about this? Because in part, you know, even if it was clear to us, even if it was clear to people who were involved that Ukraine's NATO membership was off the table for the short term, if the Russians believed, you know, fairly, unfairly, that they'd seen the trajectory things had taken over the last decade and a half, that perception in itself may have been a causal factor.

It's not a, we're building a building on Fifth Avenue, uh, situation.

You're right.

Uh, but Putin thinks you're wrong.

Uh, it's been very clear to me from the very beginning of the second Trump administration that the Putin strategy was to engage with the United States and with those particular people, Witkoff in particular, to make this about win-win economic transactions for Americans and Russians.

That's the primary focus, and ending the war dealing with Ukraine, that's secondary.

It was clear when they first showed up, the first meeting between Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Lavrov.

By the way, the Russian team, they're all the same people that I dealt with [laughs] uh, uh, when I was the ambassador.

But let's talk about Asia right now, what you're seeing over there, because Xi Jinping is rising in a way he was before, but that's accelerating fast.

It's not a, "We're building a building on Fifth Avenue," situation.

You're right.

Uh, but Putin thinks you're wrong.

Uh, it's been very clear to me from the very beginning of the second Trump administration that the Putin strategy was to engage with the United States and with those particular people, Witkoff in particular, to make this about win-win economic transactions for Americans and Russians.

That's the primary focus, and ending the war dealing with Ukraine, that's secondary.

It was clear when they first showed up, the first meeting between Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Lavrov.

By the way, the Russian team, they're all the same people that I dealt with [laughs] uh, uh, when I was the ambassador.

But let's talk about Asia right now, what you're seeing over there, because Xi Jinping is rising in a way he was before, but that's accelerating fast.

Ambassador, I don't need to tell you that's not how alliances work, but if you are our allies and you are reading this Washington Post reporting, how is it then factoring into your strategic thinking about your country's alliance and allegiance to the United States?

Well, two things.

First of all, I didn't serve in the military.

I served in the Obama administration at the National Security Council.

So dealt a lot with the Pentagon and with the military at that time.

I've studied American policy for most of my life here as a professor at Stanford.

I can't think of a moment in history where you get non-concur from so many commanders that you just described in this reporting.

How much is Putin loving all of this?

So what off-ramps are left to pursue?

again just on the diagnostics to underscore this is such a tragic mistake such a fatal mistake for american national security interests for american uh well-being and for the well-being of our allies and partners all over the world remember the world economy is suffering because of this war and it didn't accomplish any of the goals that you just outlined i i went back alex and re-read what i wrote a week after the war nothing's changed Since since a week after the war, none of those goals have been accomplished.

And in addition, now we have the additional problem of the Strait of Hormuz being closed.

Thank you for the data that you had in the in the opening to show that it is not status quo before.

And remember, that was open, of course, before the war.

And this notion that we're now going to use economic sanctions after war has failed is Usually it's the other way around.

I mean, usually presidents work through a list of options.

Of these three messages, which do you think the U.S. wants to see happen the most?

So much of the president's messages about this administration or about the golden era of America or going back to some former glory, when you hear what the premier says, when you've been—as you've been watching this all play out, does it feel like America is in a golden age, especially when it comes to our relationships with our allies?

Well, absolutely not.

It's not a golden age.

There's no evidence to support that hypothesis.

But I disagree with the premier.

I think he's wrong.

We treat communist China, Xi Jinping, President Trump treats communist leader Xi Jinping much better than he treats our Canadian allies, much better than he treats our South Korean allies, much better than he treats our European democratic allies.

What does a country right now currently, and as we end 2026 here, have to gain by saying yes to the United States, by being our ally? That's a

Do you believe this is the answer or, um, or, um, will be a very impactful tool?

I don't know.

I wanna be honest, I don't know.

I don't know what the goal is.

Uh, you just said to end the war.

Uh, have they said that? Is that what the goal is here? I thought the goal was to get rid of their nuclear weapons, to end, uh, support for terrorism, to open the Strait of Hormuz, and this is a principle problem first with this day, this D-Day, in that sanctions work best when we know what the explicit goal is.

We don't know what that is.

Was there that sort of rationalization, Michael?

Well, there was.

So I left the government right before that invasion.

So I was not in the government at the time, but it's most certainly interacting with the government and part of the debate more generally.

I think we should have had a more robust response.

We should have had more sanctions and we should have provided arms to the Ukrainians.

so that they could deter a future intervention, a future invasion, as we saw tragically in 2022.

Is it happening?

What did we learn then? What do we know now about that confrontation that helps us here in the 21st century? Good evening, Professor.

Well, good evening and thanks for having me, John.

Good to see you again.

I think it's a great place to start because it was, in my view, one of the most dangerous, probably the most dangerous moment in the Cold War.

And obviously, we still call it the Cold War historically because it didn't become a hot war between the United States and and the Soviet Union, even though they did fight from time to time proxy wars.

But that was a major crisis because, of course, it involved nuclear weapons.

And the use of nuclear weapons means complete obliteration of both countries involved and lots of other countries would be affected by it.

Why did he do that, and what did we learn from it, Michael?

What, what's your advice on how we should approach negotiating with Putin there?

Well, it's interesting you mention Bush, uh, and, 'cause that was the first time, uh, I actually briefed the president, uh, President Bush two weeks before he had that meeting, and I remember as I was listening to him talk, he's a business guy, brand new in the White House, and he genuinely wanted to do what a lot of these leaders wanna do, which is to develop a personal relationship with Putin.

And he...

That was not a mistake in Slovenia.

He, he planned that.

Uh, that was my impression from having seen him before, 'cause he thought, "Well, let's have a personal relationship, and then we'll get to these harder things." So for him, it was like he's gonna withdraw from the ABM Treaty, but if I get a, a rapport going with him, you know, I'm a business guy.

This is how the business world works.

Help us understand what we misunderstand about Xi and the current government in China and what we're missing as a country.

Do the president's latest remarks suggest an off-ramp is now on the back burner? And do you or how do you envision this playing out if more countries get drawn into this war? Which ones might be expected to line up for versus against the United States?

Well, first, he has no definition of winning.

Everybody should ask him every time he says that, what is your definition? To the best of my reading of what he says, he's actually just trying to open the Strait of Hormuz right now.

And I want to remind everybody that Strait was opened before he launched this war.

All the other goals, eliminating the nuclear weapons program, eliminating missiles, ending terror support, liberating the Iranian people, he's not even talking about.

That's the old agenda.

He's not even talking about that.

But how do you interpret the conflicting positions on this?

Do you see any chance of diplomacy turning this around? And again, those people leading the charge in terms of diplomacy, we're talking about Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, maybe a little JD Vance, possibly with a sprinkle of Marco Rubio in there.

Well, of course, I certainly hope so.

Uh, this war's a disaster.

It needs to end.

Uh, uh, everybody, I think, would agree that we want this war to end.

The problem is I don't see a strategy that the president has devised to ach- get to that end, let alone to put pressure on the Iranians to negotiate.

And I wanna emphasize, this is all, every single campaign, the last 13 days that you emphasized, is not about the nuclear weapons program.

[laughs]

But could there be other scenarios, some of which Peter just mentioned, that may have warranted that level of precaution?

Well, first, I want to level set by saying I just think it is absolutely absurd that President Trump took this gift from another country and now is using it to fly around as the president of the United States of America.

I think we've gotten so used to this administration, we just we forget about that.

This is crazy.

This is they're just doing this for free.

They just want because they love the United States of America so much that we need to remember first.

Secondly, it always seemed to me absurd that they would be able to refit this plane with all of the materials that you need to keep the president safe and to keep him in communication with the world.

You agree with that, Michael, that indeed this is just an effort to suppress the press? Or is there more to it? Could there be more to it?

Right.

It, the number of assassinated presidents is probably 5% of all presidents.

That's my guess.

I'm on live TV doing math.

But you're underscoring something I, I just think it's important we keep focusing on.

He just says things all over the time, all the time.

We don't know if they're true or not.

No problem

Ambassador McFaul, based on what we heard from the president this morning, how do you think the rest of the summit is going to go?

Well, the main goal is no drama, right? I just got back from Europe.

I just flew in from Sweden last night to be on your show.

Not a train from Long Island.

There you go.

And, you know, and stops in...

I was in Estonia, Finland, and Sweden.

What does that signal to you?

Yeah.

Second, we're doing this according to the president, and I, you know, he says a lot of things he doesn't do, so let's be careful.

Um, but we're gonna have a joint venture with a despotic regime where we're gonna charge and we're gonna take money? That seems like a really bad idea, um, uh, A, because we shouldn't be doing business with the regime, but two, you know, so many critics of our, the Obama administration's approach to Iran, was that we lifted sanctions, uh, in order to get the Iran nuclear deal.

This idea is gonna generate billions and billions of dollars for this regime.

Moreover, again, this is the president, not me, but he's hinted at lifting sanctions and tariffs on the Islamic Republic of Iran as part of, of getting a deal, uh, to, uh, to end this war.

And then I think, I didn't mention it before, but I wanna mention it now.

We just talked about the objectives and are they achieving them or not, and it's a very mixed picture I would say so far regarding their defined objectives.

Yeah.

So what message are Trump and Republicans trying to send today by referencing the torn up JCPOA?

Disinformation.

I, I, I'm trying to think of a more diplomatic word, but the way they talk about what has been accomplished in this memorandum of understanding compared to the JCPOA is complete nonsense.

It's just not true.

It's right in the preamble that Iran reiterates commitment to not developing a nuclear weapon.

Second, everyone needs to be crystal clear that what President Trump signed a few days ago is a ceasefire agreement to open the Strait of Hormuz.

It says nothing about control on enri- nuclear enrichment or nuclear weapons or missiles or support for terrorism, let alone supporting democratic change in Iran, all the goals that they've been talking about for three months.

Terms and more at applecard.com.

What should we make of the fact that those discussions around Iran's nuclear capabilities are being deferred to another day?

It means very bluntly Trump did not achieve that war objective.

Uh, he had other war objectives that he didn't achieve, but that was the paramount one.

That was the first one.

Uh, he didn't get it done, and he had to, uh, sign this memorandum of understanding to open the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before he started his war.

And not only did he have to do that, he had to pay, or at least make pledges of payments, of billions of dollars, some, uh, that we have frozen assets for the Iranians, others that our partners in the region will transfer, up to $300 billion.

That's what it says in the memorandum o- of understanding.

Ambassador McFaul, is your former boss understating things? Are we just a little bit worse off, or is this a real loss for the United States? Have we lost ground here?

Thank you.

I can get up in the morning just as long as I can stay up at night.

So very honored to be here.

Second, pretty surprising because this memorandum of understanding from what we learned from the vice president is only a page and a half long.

It's a ceasefire agreement at best.

It doesn't deal with any of the hard issues that President Trump promised that he was going to resolve.

He promised he was going to make Iran nuclear free, including getting rid of the enriched uranium.

So if he's making progress in France, what are these boys doing in Russia?

Is it happening?

Well, I hope I do in the book try to spell out a grand strategy for decades to come.

It's not just a book for the next couple of years.

And when I add up the power and on autocrats versus Democrats, I still want to be on the side of the I still think when it comes to military power, if we have our allies together, we're much stronger than the autocrats.

When it comes to economic power, yes, the Chinese are growing, but you bring the free world together, nine of the 10 largest economies in the world are democracies.

We're still stronger there.

We still have stronger universities by far, including my own at Stanford.

Do we strengthen them when we act so divided over something so obviously wrong direction, trade?

What can be done with an autocracy that is so sealed and yet it's so dangerous to our European allies and to world peace?

Well, most immediately, we can help Ukraine win.

That would be good for Ukraine and it'd be good for small D Democrats and liberal minded people inside Russia.

There's just no doubt in my mind about that.

And I'll tell you two stories about it.

I've been in the room with Vladimir Putin.

many times when I was in the government.

Do I say that correctly, Professor?