Is that money intended simply to s- basically replicate the existing choice set or to make a different set of choices going forward? 'Cause I wanna come back to this question about the cost exchange ratio, which still strikes me as uneconomical and unsustainable, and generally things that aren't sustainable don't get sustained.

So, uh, actually, at the, at, at the council, we have a study group report that's coming out this week from a defense industrial-based study group that we've been, uh, running that looks at the possibilities for what you could do to the defense industrial base over a two-year period.

And the study group concludes that scaling precise mass is, in some ways, your trade space if you wanna do this quickly, with precise mass being lower cost systems, more based in commercial manufacturing, leveraging more, uh, AI, leveraging more AI and autonomy.

Think like our version of Iran's Shahed 136, which is called, uh, the Lucas, uh, much less expensive, uh, air defense systems, systems based more on some of the lessons learned that might be relevant from places like, uh, from places like Ukraine, given what they've managed to do against, uh, against Russia.

Essentially, systems that are less expensive and less exquisite and that are built to scale, uh, from, uh, the beginning.

In some ways, that is where your trade space is if you wanna move in the next couple of years.

And the Trump administration, to its credit, has put some real money behind these systems, which they did originally in the one big, beautiful bill that passed last year.

There were a flood of stories, uh, when Operation Epic Fury first, uh, began, uh, that the Ukrainians had volunteered to provide the U.S. military with advice on drone war, both how to use them and how to, to defend against them, and the response from the Trump administration was, "Nah, we don't need your help." So help me understand to what extent the United States is its own problem here.