It, it all seems rather unlikely.

It does seem unlikely, but what the Iranians are trying to do is to revive the terms of the memorandum of understanding that they had signed with the United States.

They see this as an opportunity to now pressure the US, uh, to, um, go back to the negotiating table and, uh, to, um, implement the terms of the original MoU they had signed.

So given that, what do you think the Iranians are trying to do just to prolong the negotiations here?

Well, I, um, uh, prolonging is one, um, uh, one interpretation.

The other is reviving it.

Uh, what the Iranians, uh, want to avoid, and so do the Americans at this point, is, uh, another forever war.

The Iranians, however, want to ensure that in return for opening the Strait of Hormuz, for example, the, um, um, blockade is removed, the American naval blockade of Iranian ports.

There is this idea that you, uh, talk about in your writing too, that of Iran being caught between being a strong society and a weak state or a strong state and a weak society.

Yeah.

Y- History of modern Iran, like the history of many other, um, countries, um, is made up of this almost constant struggle between state and society, between people in position of institutions and instruments of power trying to force their ideology, their agenda, their policies On a society that beats to its own rhythm.

Beginning of the 20th century becomes a very, um, uh, exciting period of intense, uh, change.

And then what we see is that, um, Iran from the nin- from 1906, 1907 to about 1920 politically becomes dysfunctional.

So what we have is kind of a dysfunctional political system that emerges out of the constitutional revolution.

The constitutional revolution never really is able to consolidate itself past maybe five years at most, because it's one thing to capture power, it's another to hold onto it and to be able to implement your ideas and to administer a country as vast and, uh, in a historically critical juncture when colonial powers are, have designs on it as Iran.

Mm.

M- but I wonder, Professor, what, what all of this renewed fighting, this uncertainty means for those efforts to, to try to keep that sense of normalcy.

A, a number of things.

First of all, the economic consequences are tremendous, not just in terms of the inability of the states of the Persian Gulf to export oil and gas, but also the fact that so many people like me live here in the region is because this region has been not only economically prosperous, but a very safe environment to live, to work, and to bring up families, as I have done.

But now that stability and that sense of security has been shattered.

And so moving forward, it isn't just the, um, inability of these states to use the Strait of Hormuz and to export their oil and gas, but it is the increased costs of business.

But I think we should also remember that over the last twenty-four hours, something like seventeen Iranians Have died.

And so the, the fact that there is a war in Iran also means that there are shattered lives, um, uh, o-on the other side as well.

How are you feeling now about the possibility of this, this ending, that these two countries can all, all of a sudden find a, a new, a fresh path back to, to peace?

What do you think is happening right now?

Well, what we're seeing is kind of, uh, not just tit for tat, but, uh, controlled escalation.

Overnight, the United States hit a number of targets, uh, along Iran's, uh, southern coast, uh, near the Persian Gulf, and the Iranians hit as far as, um, Jordan, not just here in the Persian Gulf region, but they hit, uh, American, uh, bases in Jordan.

And so, uh, there's a concerted effort on the part of the Qataris and the Pakistanis and others to make sure that this does not escalate and things cal- calm down.

Uh, but there's of course the obvious danger that things might escalate beyond control.

I think it's important to also remember that the Iranians and the Americans were supposed to get together here in Doha on Saturday to discuss, to, to pick up where they had left off on the technical details, uh, of the MOU.

And as of yesterday at least, everybody was wondering if that meeting is still going to happen.

What is it they don't like about it? W- why would they potentially risk the situation in the way that you've just said could be an overplaying of their hand?

But I wonder if Iran maybe has gained something of a Trump card with their ability to shut it down at will.

Absolutely.

And, uh, it is, um, it's a source of leverage that, uh, Iran has come to.

Uh, you know, we've been talking, uh, throughout this program about, uh, uh, we started by talking about Donald Trump's desire to bring about regime change.

So he started the war wanting regime change in Iran, and now he's ending it wanting the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.

So the Iranians have discovered a tremendous source of, uh, leverage.

And I think it's important to keep in mind that they don't necessarily need to close it, uh, in order to impede traffic through it.

The US is not needed anymore as, as much in the Middle East because of this deal that he's made"?

Is the Gulf region, do you think, ready to reintegrate Iran into the global economy, the global security picture? Do they think that will be better for their security?

security?Uh, absolutely.

Look, um, this war demonstrated that, uh, the Islamic Republic can withstand being literally beaten up and having its leadership decapitated by two nuclear powers, the United States and Israel, and still survive.

And so the states here in the GCC, and, uh, many in even in the United States, are fully aware that the Islamic Republic isn't collapsing.

It's not going anywhere.

And so you might as well deal with it.

And the issue of missiles, from Tehran's perspective, missile defense was the only thing that Tehran had.

So where do you think, Mehran, uh, it's going to lead domestically? What will the power framework look like, and what will it mean for the Iranian people?

Mehran, what does that tell us about how significant the Strait of Hormuz is for, to Donald Trump right now?

Well, the American president never ceases to entertain, and, uh, this is yet another one of those, um, uh, statements coming out of, uh, the Trump White House that amuses more than it informs.

Uh, uh, let's remember that, uh, not that long ago, he said, "I and the ayatollah would jointly control, uh, the strait." Now, if I were sitting in Tehran or one of the, uh, members of the negotiating team, of the Iranian negotiating in Geneva and reading that, I would think that he's not, uh, opposed in principle to, uh, toll collection.

He just says, "We- I will collect the toll.

And so, um, you know, uh, this is not so much a reflection of a well-thought-out American policy as it is, uh, a, a manifestation of Trump lashing out.

So I wouldn't read too much into it.

Again, uh, I think we need to keep in mind that, uh, he's saying this, uh, just as Iranian and American negotiators are meeting in Geneva, and both sides are engaged in posturing and, and this hyperbolic statements, uh, that, uh, sound a lot more entertaining than informative.

Do you think that it cares about that at all at this point in time through negotiations?

But I wonder if Iran maybe has gained something of a Trump card with their ability to shut it down at will.

Absolutely.

And, uh, it is, um, it's a source of leverage that, uh, Iran has come to.

Uh, you know, we've been talking, uh, throughout this program about, uh, uh, we started by talking about Donald Trump's desire to bring about regime change.

So he started the war wanting regime change in Iran, and now he's ending it wanting the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.

So the Iranians have discovered a tremendous source of, uh, leverage, and I think it's important to keep in mind that they don't necessarily need to close it, uh, in order to impede traffic through it.

The mosquito fleet that the Iranian navy has, uh, can easily harass shipping up and down, um, uh, the, uh, the Strait of Hormuz or throughout the Persian Gulf.

The US is not needed anymore as, as much in the Middle East because of this deal that he's made"?

Ferd, I just, I just wanna say to, to Mehran that the point is that the strait is, uh, it comes into play in the way that, uh, Ferd describes simply because Iran realized before this all started, uh, you know, many years ago, that the strait was always gonna be a, a critical player in such a scenario.

Absolutely.

And, uh, what is shocking is that the United States does not seem to have realized that this was, um, a Trump card that the Iranians had in their hand.

Uh, their ability to either close the Strait of Hormuz or, uh, more easily to harass shipping, uh, through the Strait of Hormuz.

And I think what we're seeing is, uh, Iran, uh, now has an even greater excuse to, uh, close the Strait of Hormuz or to restrain, uh, constrain shipping, uh, from going through the Strait of Hormuz.

Because earlier today, uh, we heard President Trump say that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate, and Qatar are actively helping Israeli-American war on Iran.

And so as far as the Iranians are concerned, now th- uh, these three states are active belligerents against Iran, and therefore the Strait of Hormuz should be closed, or at least, uh, only open to shipping that the Iranians, uh, want to have, uh, open.

Mehran, what do you think? Is striking out at, at Gulf countries, uh, still to Iran's advantage, do you think?

What's the feeling on the ground there? And I take your point that in the last 48 hours, things have been much more quiet, but a- are people there questioning the security architecture? Will it have a future? Uh, a- and are they also questioning the wisdom of their government, uh, and its ties to the United States?

Uh, well, not yet, but certainly when the dust of this, uh, destructive war is over, there's going to be a lot of soul searching and a lot of very serious questions asked, a lot of serious questions that regional leaders will be asking themselves, and, uh, they will be held accountable to their populations.

And either they would, uh, deepen their security alliances with the United States, or they will continue, uh, the trend that has happened over the last, uh, decade or so, which is to diversify their security partnerships with the European Union, with Turkey, with, uh, Saudi Arabia has a strategic partnership with Pakistan.

And so what we are likely to see is a greater diversification of these security partnerships with various actors other than the United States.

I think one thing you also mentioned is really important, which is kind of, um, the way that life has been.

I think we need to remember that countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirate are among the safest in the world.

There's tremendous tranquility and security that all of us have been feeling for the last however many years, for the last several decades-

You're going to give us a good deal, a first deal on the oil.'" What should we know about him and how likely he is to be this elusive figure that the Trump administration wants in place in Iran?

So what's the diplomatic strategy for the Gulf?

Gulf?Well, you're absolutely right, Imran.

Uh, the GCC finds itself trapped, uh, in a war, uh, that it does not want, it doesn't wanna have anything to do with, and a war that is only detrimental, not just economically or in terms of reputation and the image of, uh, these states as safe havens, uh, for investment and economic growth and development.

But now, uh, what we're seeing are almost daily attacks, as you mentioned.

So on the one hand, there's this palpable desire to somehow respond, uh, to what is openly being called Iranian aggression, and on the other hand, these states are keenly aware that if they do enter the war with Iran, what is, uh, what is there to stop Donald Trump from leaving tomorrow and, uh, declaring, uh, American victory? And then these states are, uh, left fighting a neighbor.

Uh, I think the GCC states are quite aware that, uh, they are either blessed or cursed geographically to be next to Iran.

They cannot ignore it.

Is there a wider diplomacy angle here that Iran might push, you know, get out of Lebanon as well, if they do come to the table? And does that then become so wide it's almost impossible to get to peace?

I asked him why there's so little in the way of a defined political opposition inside the country

The Islamic Republic succeeded in eliminating any viable opposition.

From 1980 to about 1988, there was a reign of terror in Iran where people were, uh, executed en masse.

Then we have mass repression in the form of people being thrown in jail or people being kicked out

And right now, we have Donald Trump saying to the Iranian people, "This is your opportunity to rise up and protest and get rid of this government." Is that something that they are in a position to do while under bombardment?

Absolutely not.

Life in Iran now is a daily struggle for survival, literally.

It's a struggle for life and death.

How much influence, uh, did he already have inside the system and, and what do you make of his appointment?

Well, as you mentioned, uh, we know very little about him, uh, at least in the public domain.

But we do know that he was extremely active in his father's office.

He was involved in some of the most important decisions of the state, particularly over the last decade or so when his father became intimately involved in the day-to-day running of the state.

And we know that he's got connections throughout the Iranian deep state, particularly within the, um, uh, radio and television network, in the, um, Revolutionary Guards, um, among the, um, uh, Iranian parliament called the Majlis.

And so he's been someone who has been involved, not necessarily in the public domain, but from behind the scenes, he's been actively involved in the running of the state, and he knows how a very complex political system like the Iranian, uh, system operates and, uh, and functions.

And so, um, uh, obviously he, uh, the, at a time when the r- uh, system is confronting a serious, um, uh, existential crisis, it wants continuity.

So how under threat is, is he at this point in time? Because we've seen the, the US and, and Israel o- obviously be very effective in targeting Iranian leaders, whether they're political or military, um, through this war.

He likes the no more, uh, foreign wars slogan.

Uh, I do agree that this could, uh, turn out to be a problem, and as Daniel just mentioned, uh, the, uh, if this becomes a prolonged war, depending on how the Iranians manage to put up, um, uh, if this becomes a prolonged war, it could turn into a huge political liability for the American president and also for Israel.

The Iranians, I think it's important to remember, are counting on a prolonged war of attrition.

The assumption in Tehran is that neither Tel Aviv nor Washington can afford casualties, can afford a prolonged war, whereas rightly or wrongly, the stewards of the Islamic Republic maintain they can afford, uh, a prolonged conflict with the United States.

And if they are indeed correcting their calculations, this could turn out to be another one of those unending wars in which many of Trump's supporters and many in his inner circle promised, uh, not to have anymore.

It's changed, and in fact, it's been somewhat confused.

Absolutely.

I quite, uh, agree with you.