So maybe impacting that, I think, would be quite interesting.

Yeah.

So the notion of intentionality was first introduced at the beginnings of phenomenology by a teacher of Edmund Husserl, who is the founder of that tradition, who argued that intentionality was the mark of the mental.

So they can use the notion of intentionality to distinguish the mental from anything else.

So intentionality would actually mark out What is the subject matter of psychology? And what is intentionality? Well, it's the directedness of the mind at the world.

So when I have a thought about my cats, then my thought is about the cats, and it has the property of intentionality, which is what makes my thoughts about something, about that specific object, in the particular way that I'm thinking about them.

and intentionality has often been understood in in representationalist terms so we think that what has intentionality must be states of mind which are like little representations like pictures or sentences that are inside of the brain that have this intentional directedness but in the the traditions that I work in in cognitive science, we try to operate with non-representational understandings of intentionality.

So I'd love to hear your opinion about it, of how fateful Dreyfus was to Heidegger and how much of a bridge you can make from Heidegger all the way to these kinds of cocci arguments, and then your overall critique of Dreyfus as well in whatever you think he got wrong.

How does phenomenology come into the picture, particularly in the domain of philosophy? And how do you look then at the relationship between embodied cognition and phenomenology?

Great.

Now, so phenomenology, first of all, we should see as a movement within philosophy that arose at the turn of the 20th century and was initiated by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl.

And he was concerned with classical philosophical questions like what is reality, what is truth, how to understand knowledge, how to understand meaning, logic, mathematics.

So he was really working with foundational questions in philosophy.

And he developed a method for addressing those questions, which involved a bracketing of the natural attitude that we ordinarily operate with.

where the natural attitude is what we normally take for granted in our thinking as scientists, for instance, but also in our everyday lives when we take for granted the existence of material worlds that we engage with.

So what does that entail exactly?