Janis N. Kluge
Economist
1
APPEARANCES
1
PODCASTS
012
DEC 30
JAN 6
JAN 13
JAN 20
JAN 27
FEB 3
FEB 10
FEB 17
FEB 24
MAR 3
MAR 10
MAR 17
MAR 24
MAR 31
APR 7
APR 14
APR 21
APR 28
MAY 5
MAY 12
MAY 19
MAY 26
JUN 2
JUN 9
JUN 16
JUN 23
JUN 30
JUL 7
JUL 14
JUL 21
JUL 28
AUG 4
AUG 11
AUG 18
AUG 25
SEP 1
SEP 8
SEP 15
SEP 22
SEP 29
OCT 6
OCT 13
OCT 20
OCT 27
NOV 3
NOV 10
NOV 17
NOV 24
DEC 1
DEC 8
DEC 15
DEC 22
DEC 29
JAN 5
JAN 12
JAN 19
JAN 26
FEB 2
FEB 9
FEB 16
FEB 23
MAR 2
MAR 9
MAR 16
MAR 23
MAR 30
APR 6
APR 13
APR 20
APR 27
MAY 4
MAY 11
MAY 18
MAY 25
JUN 1
JUN 8
JUN 15
JUN 22
JUN 29
JUL 6
JUL 13
JUL 20
JUL 27
AUG 3
AUG 10
AUG 17
AUG 24
AUG 31
SEP 7
SEP 14
SEP 21
SEP 28
Jul 30, 2026
Inside Putin’s War Recruitment Machine
13:19
13:24
13:38
13:53
14:01
Alexander GabuevHOST
What do you view the major factor determining Moscow's ability to recruit soldiers?

Janis KlugeGUEST
Well, regarding the data and the discrepancies, I think it's important to mention that this whole system of paying huge bonuses for recruitment was established essentially in the year 2024.

Janis KlugeGUEST
It existed before with much smaller numbers, but in the second half of 2024, Putin compelled regions to pay a minimum of 400,000 rubles per recruit, and the federal budget also started paying 400,000.

Janis KlugeGUEST
So this is when these big amounts of money were actually becoming relevant, and that's also when the region started to reliably publish this data.

Janis KlugeGUEST
The data I have before, so the first half of 2024, is also extrapolated but from a smaller data set.
24 MINS LATER