HMAC

Pre-signed URLs don't work on a custom domain, only on the long account address.

If you want your own domain with auth, Cloudflare points you at HMAC validation in its firewall rules, and that needs a Pro plan or above, which is why people let the worker do the checking itself.

And if the worker streams the audio instead of redirecting?

Then it has to handle range requests properly or seeking and resuming break.

It came down to how the card verified the transaction data during that MuSig2 process.

[lip smacks] In cryptography, you use something called an HMAC, a hash-based message authentication code.

Okay.

Think of it as a tamper-evident digital seal.

What you're describing is an integrity check.

The USG parameter is typically generated using an HMAC.

An HMAC.

HMAC.

Hash-based message authentication code.

Exactly.

[chuckles]

Highly hostile, particularly when advertising revenue is involved.

Point each at assigned route handler.

Verify the HMAC.

Then call revalidateTag with the specific product handle from the payload.

Tag your fetches explicitly rather than relying on paths that lets you invalidate a single product without blowing the entire collection cache.

The request state blob is attacker-controlled input.

If it influences authorization or anything that matters, it has to be integrity protected, HMAC or authenticated encryption.

Don't accept a state token from an untrusted hop and treat it as authoritative.

Which sounds paranoid until it isn't.

Then version two, nineteen ninety-six, adds get bulk and sixty-four-bit counters and keeps the same weak community security.

Version three, ratified across RFCs three four one one through thirty four eighteen, adds real authentication with HMAC-SHA-2, encryption with AES or DES, and view-based access control.

The IETF designates version three as the current full internet standard and marks the earlier versions historic or obsolete.

So on paper, the security problem is solved.

The article's point is that you don't just want to know whether the signature matches, you want to compare it in a way that doesn't give an attacker clues from how long the check takes.

So it's HMAC with a shared secret, then a constant time compare like Node's crypto timing safe equal.

That closes off a small but real side channel.

Right, so the secret proves the webhook came from the provider, and the timing safe compare keeps the check from revealing anything extra.

One's already done, and I think one is in process.

Also in this release, there's support for HMAC cryptography and hardware key modules.

The hardware key lets you get at a secret key that your hardware might have, but which can't be revealed publicly, or you can't even see the bits itself, but it's just used internally by the cryptography hardware and the chip.

There's isochronous USB-in support, which is used for webcams and You'll see some stuff about that.

Thanks to HopCopy, who's been working on better looking font support and supporting TTF fonts.

directly and supporting kerning and other things like that that really make for a much snappier looking display and the result of that has also been some experimentation with native mpy files to speed things up and mikey sklar has been helping with that so i'd like to thank him with that and also thanks to mikey for sort of being willing to test just about anything or he might suggest like well you could try this or in the future and he does it in like in 45 minutes So that's really helpful.

Thanks to M Maybe who added HMAC support.

As we mentioned before, that was in 11.0.0.2. And there's more coming for that as well.