Greco-Turkish War

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role.

And at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, The Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a port of region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace.

But they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

So in terms of alliances, Turkey's domestic and transnational allies benefited and supported the Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Littoral, but not those in Istanbul.

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role, and at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, The Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a port of region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace.

But they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

So in terms of alliances, Turkey's domestic and transnational allies benefited and supported the Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Littoral, but not those in Istanbul.

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role And at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, the Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace, but they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

Nevertheless, Greece was in a very weak position vis-a-vis Turkey at the conference, and it really needed the great powers, the international organization factor, to back up its position.

And at the Lausanne Conference, the conference...

the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, the Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace, but they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

Nevertheless, Greece was in a very weak position vis-a-vis Turkey at the conference, and it really needed the great powers, the international organization factor, to back up its position.

So in terms of alliances, Turkey's domestic and transnational allies benefited and supported the Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Littoral, but not those in Istanbul.

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role And at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, the Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace, but they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

Nevertheless, Greece was in a very weak position vis-a-vis Turkey at the conference, and it really needed the great powers, the international organization factor, to back up its position.

So in terms of alliances, Turkey's domestic and transnational allies benefited and supported the Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Littoral, but not those in Istanbul.

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role And at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, the Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace, but they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the

conference.

So in terms of alliances, Turkey's domestic and transnational allies benefited and supported the Orthodox Christians from the Ottoman Littoral, but not those in Istanbul.

The Greeks in Istanbul played a key economic role And at the Lausanne Conference, the peace conference at the end of the Greco-Turkish War, where the, quote, population exchange was being negotiated, the Turkish delegation during those conversations became convinced that the economic losses of expelling the Istanbul Greeks would be too great for the new republic to manage, which restrained that decision.

Additionally, Turkey was hoping that by agreeing to allow the Istanbul Greeks to remain, that it could also negotiate an exemption for the Muslims in Western Thrace in Greece, a region of Greece.

And this was important because the Turkish nationalists were hoping for a future plebiscite where those Muslims would vote to join Turkey and Turkey would be able to regain some of its lost European lands that it had lost during the Balkan Wars.

The second key factor is the homeland state.

So in this case, the homeland state was Greece.

Greece was the loser of the Greco-Turkish War and had acquiesced and resettled the Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic Littoral, as well as Eastern Thrace, but they were adamantly opposed to accepting the Greeks in Istanbul at the conference.

Nevertheless, Greece was in a very weak position vis-a-vis Turkey at the conference, and it really needed the great powers, the international organization factor, to back up its position.