Here is Grant.

Well, I, I think the essence of decision-making is resolving uncertainty, and it starts at the very beginning.

Um, one of the things that my colleague Roger Estall, um, who's since died unfortunately, and I put into our book Deciding was, uh, we, uh, made explicit the implicit process that we all use for making decisions.

We, we call it the universal decision-making process, but we didn't invent it.

It's, it's what you and I and everybody else actually uses.

And we, we said that framing the decision is really important because you need to have clarity on, for example, on what your organization's purpose is.

So there's always uncertainty there.

Uh, there, there's a lot of-

Have we become better at managing risk or simply better at creating the processes and documentations around it? Here is Grant.

Well, I think, look, I've already alluded to the fact there's two streams of thinking there.

I've always been fairly fairly critical about the whole COSO ERM type of thinking, which was quite frankly arose after the collapse of the Enron organization, which took out Arthur Anderson with it at the same time.

And we know that consulting revenues in what was eventually the big four dropped dramatically and the organizations and their sponsors approached COSO to allow them to write a standard.

And that standard was very much about was very much about, I believe, generating income.

If you read the first COSRM standard, I know it's been revised since, it's almost impenetrable.

You couldn't understand it unless you brought a consultant in to help you do that.

Has a profession become better at managing risk or simply better at documenting it?

And when all of this happens, like when decision-making goes wrong, can you think of any examples in the recent past of where it has gone wrong? You're talking about my

career here.

I mean, thankfully, there have been some occasions when decisions have gone right or I've been involved and stopped things which would have turned into a disaster.

But invariably, I and my colleague, Roger Astell, we spent a lot of our career going in after poor decisions which have led to catastrophes.

You know, there has been so many out there that mankind has gone through in the last few years.

You know, Challenger in 1986, the Boeing 737 MAX episode, where the FAA assumed that Boeing would be doing its own quality checks.

Boeing assumed that somebody would be training the pilots in the new software they introduced to stop the nose of the plane going up all the time, but actually didn't.

So just from that perspective, how would you describe the importance of good risk management in decision making?

Looking back, what problem was ISO 31000 actually trying to solve?

That's a very good question because I'm not sure we knew what that was at the time.

Standards are written by a process of evolution.

The 31,000 was based very much on the Australian New Zealand standard 4360, which was produced first in 1995, then updated in 1999 and eventually in 2004.

And the real purpose of that standard was to align different ways of risk assessment and risk treatment, as it was called.

It didn't associate itself with anything other than the creation of information which could be used for decision making.

My own background is very much that when I first started, it was very simple.

Where do you think they stand in the context of what you just said? Because practically they're pushing for something that could lead to the opposite outcome of what they're looking for.