Flight management system

Go ahead.

The FMS is confident.

It commands a turn to intercept a track that a second ago was directly beneath the aircraft and is now 200 miles to the right.

The displays are clean.

A rapid increase in estimated position uncertainty, the EPU, or the actual navigation performance, ANP.

That's the box telling you it's become less sure of itself, which is the honest version of a spoofing event.

What else? A caution that says GPS position and IRS or FMS position disagree.

That's the aircraft catching itself in the act.

Yeah.

And should we talk about the Air Current's report about the 737 Max FMS software as well?

well?Yeah, that's what we're talking about

'Cause it plays into this as well, but apparently, paraphrasing, was it John's article or was it-

Okay, John's article, of course it was.

Wanna make sure I'm attributing the correct author.

But apparently, at least here in the US, 737 MAX operators, or at least United, have been using FMS software that dates back to about a decade, when the aircraft first launched, because subsequent software updates have been so buggy that these airlines either have not applied those software updates or have s- had bad experiences with them and rolled back to earlier software, which is impressive that you can even do that, because sometimes when you apply new software, you can't even roll back.

I'm staring at my Mac angrily right now.

The seven eighty-seven type rating does not transfer to the A350, full stop.

You're talking about a completely different fly-by-wire architecture, different normal law protections, a different flight management and guidance system, which Airbus calls the FMGS.

The side stick versus yoke question alone represents a fundamental shift in how pilots physically interface with the aircraft.

The Airbus philosophy and the Boeing philosophy diverge at a deep level.

For a pilot converting from a seven eighty-seven to an A350, the type rating process is not a weekend seminar.

We are talking a full conversion course, ground school, full flight simulator hours, line training.

The FMGS has its own logic, its own entry conventions, its own quirks.

You have to unlearn some things before you can learn the new ones.

Typically, these require special training in order to get lower minimums, so they are not published in the typical databases.

The user, however, is able to get the charts and FMS, FMS data needed to fly them.

Think airports like Juneau, Telluride, and Aspen that have a lot of, a lot of challenging terrain where the usual approach criteria results in very high minimums.

Hope this answers your questions, Romeo Whiskey, the Terpself.

The pilots were concerned that if they remained at Edinburgh, there was a possibility that their low fuel state and the wind conditions could mean they had no other option than to fly through a wind shear warning while on approach.

They calculated that if they diverted to Manchester, they would land between 500 and 700 kilograms of fuel, and subsequently the FMS, Fuel Management System, calculated that the expected arrival fuel was to be 300 kilos.

Both calculations meant the aircraft would land below the final reserve fuel of 1,100 kilos, but the commander considered the safest option was to divert to Manchester, where the aircraft landed with 363 kilos of fuel.

The AAIB noted that there was no further discussion by the pilots about the ex- expected fuel remaining on arrival at Manchester, except that they realized they would not have enough fuel for another go-around.

At that time, the safety pilot took the right seat, and the student as well as the Estonian CAA inspector left the cockpi- cockpit to sit in the cabin instead with the rest of the students.

34 seconds later, the master warning button was pressed to finally silence the aural warning, which was, by the way, still sounding this entire w- time for a master warning, and the captain then asked, quote, "What is the heading of the runway?" end quote, and the safety pilot replied, "262." The safety pilot then entered the heading into the FMS, the flight management system.

The safety pilot then stated over the radio, quote, "Tallinn tower, we're going for runway 26," end quote.

Putting the safety pilot in the right seat was a really good call, by the way.

The total absence of radio chatter, automated weather broadcasts, ATIS, and beacon signals informs Brian that they aren't merely experiencing an onboard radio failure, the entire radio frequency spectrum of the world beneath them has been erased.

Autopilot and Flight Management Systems Prior to the crisis, Flight 29 is operating under the control of its Flight Management System and Autopilot.

The FMS is an integrated computer system that automates a wide variety of in-flight tasks, guiding the aircraft along a pre-programmed flight plan consisting of specific GPS waypoints, altitudes, and speeds.

When the human pilots disappear, the autopilot continues to fly the plane seamlessly along its preset trajectory.

A major study was conducted to evaluate the performance of two groups of pilots.

The control group was composed of pilots who flew an older version of a common twin-jet airliner equipped with analog instrumentation, and the experimental group was composed of pilots who flew the same aircraft but newer models equipped with an electronic flight instrument system, EFIS, and a flight management system, FMS.

The pilots were evaluated in maintaining aircraft parameters such as heading, altitude, airspeed, glide slope, and localizer deviations, as well as pilot control inputs.

These were recorded during a variety of normal, abnormal, and emergency maneuvers during four hours of simulator sessions.

The differences in hand flying skills between the two groups became more significant during abnormal maneuvers such as slam dunks.

When given close crossing restrictions, the analog crews were more adept at the mental math and usually maneuvered the aircraft in a smoother manner to make the restriction.

On the other hand, the EFIS crews tended to go heads down and tried to solve the crossing restriction on the FMS.

Refer to Figure 17-19 with errata.