Ethics

Public opinion among the Greeks did something to moralize religion.

the gods were supposed to govern human affairs and rulers whether real or imaginary cannot but become associated to some extent with ideas of justice they became more particularly associated with the keeping of promises which is the very foundation of social order by the greek custom of invoking them as witnesses to oaths for to break an oath which a god had witnessed was as the decalogue puts it taking his name in vain conduct which he naturally resented moreover zeus the supreme god father of gods and men was regarded as being in a particular way the patron of destitute persons and of strangers at the same time it must not be supposed that morality ever became so completely identified with religion in greece as in ancient israel or among christian nations and to the fact of their distinction is due the constitution of an independent moral philosophy by the early greek thinkers perhaps also the constitution of an independent physical philosophy as well.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCHOOL OF MELITUS.

PART II.

3.

THE SEVEN SAGES In an early stage of civilization, people are saved the trouble of thinking about moral philosophy or abstract principles of right conduct by learning the laws and customs of their land or tribe, just as mythology saves them the trouble of finding scientific explanations of natural processes.

but where a number of petty states exist side by side each with laws of its own where repeated changes of government involve the necessity of making new laws above all where the individual members of the community have so far emancipated themselves from the yoke of custom as to exercise a certain discretion in the management of their private affairs there a sort of moral rationalism will arise, an idea that certain things should be done because they are good in themselves, not because they are prescribed by authority.

This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing, and the only improvement that can be made in it is to add the principle on which it is based, so that we may both satisfy ourselves of its completeness, and also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions.

all rational knowledge is either material or formal the former considers some object the latter is concerned only with the form of the understanding and of the reason itself and with the universal laws of thought in general without distinction of its objects formal philosophy is called logic material philosophy however has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject is again twofold for these laws are either laws of nature or of freedom the science of the former is physics that of the latter ethics they are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy respectively Logic cannot have any empirical part, that is, a part in which the universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken from experience, otherwise it would not be logic, i.e., a canon for the understanding or the reason valid for all thought and capable of demonstration.

natural and moral philosophy on the contrary can each have their empirical part since the former has to determine the laws of nature as an object of experience the latter the laws of the human will so far as it is affected by nature the former however being laws according to which everything does happen the latter laws according to which everything ought to happen Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not.

We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of experience.

On the other hand, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure philosophy.

Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law.

if however we wish to gain an entrance for the moral law it is very useful to bring one and the same action under the three specified conceptions and thereby as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends.

Ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature.

after having spent two sessions in edinburgh my father perceived or he heard from my sisters that i did not like the thought of being a physician so he proposed that i should become a clergyman he was very properly vehement against my turning into an idle sporting man which then seemed my probable destination i asked for some time to consider as from what little i had heard or thought on the subject i had scruples about declaring my belief in all the dogmas of the church of england though otherwise i liked the thought of being a country clergyman accordingly i read with care pearson on the creed and a few other books on divinity and as i did not then in the least doubt the strict and literal truth of every word in the bible i soon persuaded myself that our creed must be fully accepted considering how fiercely i have been attacked by the orthodox it seems ludicrous that i once intended to be a clergyman nor was this intention and my father's wish ever formerly given up but died a natural death when on leaving cambridge i joined the beagle as a naturalist if the phrenologists are to be trusted i was well fitted in one respect to be a clergyman a few years ago the secretaries of a german psychological society asked me earnestly by letter for a photograph of myself and some time afterwards i received the proceedings of one of the meetings in which it seemed that the shape of my head had been the subject of a public discussion and one of the speakers declared that i had the bump of reverence developed enough for ten priests as it was decided that i should be a clergyman it was necessary that i should go to one of the english universities and take a degree but as i had never opened a classical book since leaving school i found to my dismay that in the two intervening years i had actually forgotten incredible as it may appear almost everything which i had learnt even to some few of the greek letters i did not therefore proceed to cambridge at the usual time in october but worked with a private tutor in shrewsbury and went to cambridge after the christmas vacation early in eighteen twenty eight i soon recovered my school's standard of knowledge and could translate easy greek books such as homer and the greek testament with moderate facility during the three years which i spent at cambridge my time was wasted as far as the academical studies were concerned as completely as at edinburgh and at school i attempted mathematics and even went during the summer of eighteen twenty eight with a private tutor a very dull man to barmouth but i got on very slowly the work was repugnant to me chiefly from my not being able to see any meaning in the early steps in algebra this impatience was very foolish and in after years i have deeply regretted that i did not proceed far enough at least to understand something of the great leading principles of mathematics for men thus endowed seem to have an extra sense but i do not believe that i should ever have succeeded beyond a very low grade with respect to classics i did nothing except attend a few compulsory college lectures and the attendance was almost nominal in my second year i had to work for a month or two to pass the little go which i did easily Again, in my last year I worked with some earnestness for my final degree of B.A. and brushed up my classics, together with a little algebra and Euclid, which latter gave me much pleasure, as it did in school.

In order to pass the B.A. examination, it was also necessary to get up Paley's Evidences of Christianity and his Moral Philosophy.

This was done in a thorough manner, and I am convinced that I could have written out the whole of the evidences with perfect correctness, but not, of course, in the clear language of Paley.

The logic of his book and, as I may add, of his natural theology, gave me as much delight as did Euclid.

but i got on very slowly the work was repugnant to me chiefly from my not being able to see any meaning in the early steps in algebra this impatience was very foolish and in after years i have deeply regretted that i did not proceed far enough at least to understand something of the great leading principles of mathematics for men thus endowed seem to have an extra sense but i do not believe that i should ever have succeeded beyond a very low grade with respect to classics i did nothing except attend a few compulsory college lectures and the attendance was almost nominal in my second year i had to work for a month or two to pass the little go which i did easily Again, in my last year I worked with some earnestness for my final degree of B.A. and brushed up my classics, together with a little algebra and Euclid, which latter gave me much pleasure, as it did in school.

In order to pass the B.A. examination, it was also necessary to get up Paley's Evidences of Christianity and his Moral Philosophy.

This was done in a thorough manner, and I am convinced that I could have written out the whole of the evidences with perfect correctness, but not, of course, in the clear language of Paley.

The logic of his book and, as I may add, of his natural theology, gave me as much delight as did Euclid.