Are we asking our allies to be less ambiguous than we are ourselves?

So I won't comment on specific conversations, uh, you know, going on in the Pentagon, but one thing I think I, y- people can, I think, fairly criticize me for my views or, you know, maybe I'm, uh, too direct or, uh, any number of things.

I don't think somebody can criticize me for being inconsistent or unclear where I'm coming from, and I think this is a good example of where what we are asking our allies to do is...

Of course, I'm not gonna ask them to do something that's way beyond what we would do.

That's violates common sense.

That's not realistic.

What we are trying to do is put everybody on the same page in terms of whatever contingency they might be facing, whether it's in Asia or Europe or the Min- and say, "Hey, what can we reasonably expect?" I think with, with, uh, Japan, we're having much more candid conversations.

Right

Is NATO to get involved? Is that a factor for China?

Yeah, it's a factor.

I don't think Europe is going to play a particularly significant role directly in the military balance in the Pacific.

What I think the main role, you know, Europe is the secondary theater for us.

It's very important, but it's distinctly less important than Asia.

And furthermore, the chance of another state becoming or a state becoming hegemonic in that region is far less.

I mean, China is half of Asia's GDP, so it stands a very plausible chance of establishing a dominant position in the region.

How would the coalition acquiring another nuclear power, Japan and Korea, are two possibilities? How would that change the formula and would that successfully deny China its advantage?

How so?

No, I think you put your finger on it, John, right? The issue that Clausewitz, of course, was a master of is that the strength itself is not the only sort of factor that's relevant here.

The question is how much and how avidly are the combatants prepared to dedicate that amount of strength, right? France under the Bourbons in 1785 or something, the fervor of the French nation was much more Modest.

Right.

Whereas six, seven years later, with the level mass and the mass popular, you know, popular support for the revolutionary armies and the defense of the nation and so forth.

You know, suddenly France was putting out a whole different type of military strength and ambition and aggressiveness.

And so so the question here to put the point on this is.

Is that correct?

Or

they can try to horizontally escalate.

Let's say they try to do something to us, like they attack our soldiers in the Middle East or shoot down something, a plane or something, in a totally unrelated area.

But I don't think that's going to work for them because why would we give up under those circumstances? This Taiwan issue has now taken on an outsized significance, so they're going to be going after symbolic pinpricks around the horizon or the horizontal area that aren't going to make a difference.

If they are nasty enough, for instance, if they go more in the vertical direction and they say, well, if you don't get off Taiwan, you know, we're going to nuke you.

Well, that's the kind of context in which that burden of escalation is going to lie very heavily on their on their shoulders, because if they, let's say, drop a nuclear bomb in the middle of the ocean to make a point, we're going to say, well, OK, but that's you know, that doesn't that's not going to change our view.

And if they actually go through and, say, drop an atomic weapon on American city, then they're going to catalyze what FDR called, you know, American people's righteous might, you know, our righteous anger or what Clausewitz called the flashing sword of vengeance.

Wouldn't the supply chain just break at that moment?

Bridge, what is denial defense? How does it work?

A denial of defense is basically the ability to deny China its ability to subordinate one of the members of the anti-hegemonic coalition, and in this case, Taiwan.

So it's an ability to keep Taiwan going on our side, and that's certainly against the punishment approach, which should be easier, but also against that direct invasion.

So the key to the fait accompli is successfully affecting a fait accompli is for the aggressor to seize and to hold the key territory, really, of a targeted country.

So, you know, if China decides to just seize and hold the two tiny offshore islands that Taiwan holds right across off the Chinese mainland, that's not going to get Taiwan to give up.

Also, if China lands on Taiwan but gets ejected before it can establish its hold, that's not going to work.

Rather, China's got to seize Taiwan's Taipei, Kaohsiung, the military bases, these kind of key areas, and hold them.

What does that teach us about denial of defense?

What advantage does that give them? What does that mean for the coalition?

Right.

Exactly.

I think you put your finger on it, John, that Beijing's strategic problem is to collapse the coalition without precipitating the very large war that would indubitably be very costly and risky and that they very well might lose.

Right.

Normally being a Clausewitzian and in this context, the direct application of military force is the most attractive if you can just defeat your opponent.

That's the best thing to do.

When the Chinese foray into the Taiwan Strait, when they send strategic bombers past in the air defense identification zone of Taiwan, what are they using? What is that? Is that punishment? Is that fait accompli predicate? How do you view those maneuvers, Bridge?

What does that mean?

Sure.

So, I mean, you've described very eloquently, John, you know, what the anti-hegemonic coalition is all about.

It's basically a classic balancing coalition.

Its exact form is ambiguous and inchoate and may never be formally and may be overlapping, may be confused.

That's not the point.

Essentially, an anti-hegemonic coalition is just a description for states that are meaningfully acting in some way together to check China's dominance in the region.

What is the punishment tool? How does it work?

So in constructing that, is it... appropriate for the U.S. to have other filters for other countries in the coalition? Must those other countries be secure, free, and prosperous? Must they be democracies?

No, actually, not at all.

I mean, I think the goal of policy is to promote Americans' security, freedom, and prosperity, and that may require affiliating with countries that are not themselves Republican systems like ours.

I mean, obviously, I think we all – wish for other countries to be governed in a civilized and kind of liberal and Republican way.

But that's not the goal of American foreign policy.

And I really try to root my argument.

You know, one of the things that I've been very frustrated by over the last generation, I would say, is that American foreign policy discussion has become very attenuated in its connection to concrete American interests.

What is defensibility?

now know about its possible opponent, China, in a limited war? Good evening to you.

Good evening, John.

It's wonderful to be back on with you.

It's a thanks for pleasure to be back on and an honor.

What is a limited war? A limited war is something that sounds paradoxical, but is very actually deeply rooted in basically human nature and certainly military affairs, which is the idea that.

Even in wars that engage people's deepest emotions and aspirations and fears, there are almost always incentives to keep a war from spiraling to the kind of the very worst levels of violence.

I mean, World War II is in most respects a total war, but the vast majority of other wars in human history have been limited.

Is that an example of a limited war that the more powerful state lost? I'm talking beyond China now to what is possible in a conflict in Asia again.

Is NATO to get involved? Is that a factor for China?

Yeah, it's a factor.

I don't think Europe is gonna play a s- particularly significant role directly in the military balance in the Pacific.

Um, what I think the main role...

You know, Europe is the secondary theater for us.

It's, it's very important but it's distinctly less important than Asia.

And furthermore, uh, the, the chance of a, of a s- of another state becoming or a state becoming hegemonic in that region is far less.

How would the coalition acquiring another nuclear power, Japan and Korea are two possibilities, how would that s- change the formula and would that successfully deny China its advantage?

How so?

Mm-hmm.

No, I think you put your finger on it, John, right? The, the, the issue that Clausewitz of course was a master of is, is that, you know, the, the strength itself is not the only, uh, uh, sort of cr- factor that's relevant here.

The question is, how much and how avidly are the combatants prepared to dedicate that, that amount of strength, right? The, the, the France under the Bourbons in 1785 or something, the, the, the fervor of the French nation was much more modest, right? Whereas six, seven years later with the Levée en masse and, and, and the mass popul- you know, popular support for the revolutionary armies and the defense of the nation and so forth, you know, suddenly France was putting out a whole different type of military strength and, and ambition and aggressiveness.

And so, so the question here to put a, to put point on it is, um, you know, in this more difficult, much more difficult and challenging and costly military situation in which either China has already seized Taiwan or we see that in order to defend Taiwan or in the future, say the Philippines, uh, we're gonna have to mount, mount a much larger and more aggressive military campaign, not this targeted one that I'm, I'm emphasizing as, as optimal, how are we gonna do that? On what basis? Because that requires resolve.

It requires us to have that morale.

And, you know, this is in the sense in which I think Napoleon said that morale is to strength as three is to one in war or something like that.

Is that correct?

What is to be done? Bridge, what is horizontal escalation? What is vertical escalation?

Horizontal escalation is basically the idea that instead of contesting the kind of, the direct battle that you're thinking about, so think Taiwan here, or an earlier era, think of, say, Korea in 1950, i- instead you attack your enemy in, in some other geographic location or some other area that's not, you know, militarily connected to the direct theater.

So, you know, if we, uh, in, in the case of Taiwan, if we, let's say, attacked the Chinese in Xinjiang, or we attacked their base in Djibouti.

Vertical escalation is basically increasing the intensity of the conflict.

So at the highest end, it's the use of nuclear weapons at scale, but o- it could be, you know, terror bombing or large-scale conventional bombing or attacks, uh, designed to impose more cost and, and, and increase the intensity of conflict.

That is not easy for China to do, so would, would vertical escalation be more agreeable to China?

S- so, well, it depends on where...

So I think, I think, let's, let's break it down a little bit.

What does that teach us about denial defense, Bridge?

Well, what it teaches us is that, um...

I think it- there- I found, uh, a great quote by, by, um, air- Air Marshall Dowding to that exact point.

He said, "My goal here is not to defeat Germany.

And the war is just to deny the invasion." It's a really good situation if you can arrange things such that, uh, our metric of success is essentially denial of the invasion, right? Because an invasion is really, really hard across water.

Now, it can be done.

We've been w- sailing all over the world for the last 70, 75 years and, and have a- certainly have any ability to invade people.

What does that mean, Bridge?

What advantage does that give them? What, what, uh, what does that mean for the coalition?

Right.

Exactly.

I think you put your finger on it, John.

That, that, that Beijing's strategic problem is, uh, to, to collapse the coalition without precipitating the very large war that would indubitably be very costly and risky and that they very well might lose, right? Normally being a Clausewitzian, and in, in this context, the direct application of military force is the most attractive.

If you can just defeat your opponent, that's the best thing to do.

You know, as Napoleon said, "If you wanna take Vienna, take Vienna.

When the Chinese foray into the Taiwan Strait, when they send strategic bombers past into the a- air defense identification zone of Taiwan, what are they using? What is that? Is that punishment? Is that fait accompli predicate? What, how do you view those, uh, those maneuvers, Bridge?

What does that mean?

Sure.

So I mean, you've described very eloquently, John, you know, what the anti-hegemonic coalition is all about.

It's basically a classic balancing coalition.

Its exact form is ambiguous and inchoate and may never be formally, and may be overlapping, may be confused.

That's not the point.

But essentially an anti-hegemonic coalition is just a description for states that are meaningfully acting in some way together to check China's dominance of the region.

What is the punishment tool? How does it work?

So in constructing that, is it appropriate for the US to have other filters for other countries in the coalition? Must those other countries be secure, free, and prosperous? Must they be democracies?

No, uh, actually not at all.

I mean, I think the goal of policy is to promote Americans' security, freedom, and prosperity.

And that may require, um, uh, affiliating with countries that are not themselves, uh, republican systems, uh, like ours.

I mean, obviously I think we all wish for c- uh, other countries to be governed in a, in a civilized and kind of, uh, liberal and, and republican m- way.

Um, but that's not the goal of American foreign policy.

And I really try to root my argument, uh, y- you know, one of the things that I've been very frustrated by over the last generation or so, I, I would say is that, um, American foreign policy discussion has become very attenuated in its connection to concrete American interests.

What is defensibility?

What is limited war and what does the US now know about its possible opponent China in a limited war? Good evening to you.

Good evening, John.

It's, it's wonderful to be back on with you.

It's a thanks for... a pleasure to be back on, and, and an honor.

Um, what is a limited war? A limited war is something that sounds paradoxical but is very actually deeply rooted in basically human nature and certainly military affairs, which is the idea that, y- you know, even in wars that engage people's, you know, uh, deepest emotions and, uh, you know, aspirations and fears, there are al- almost always incentives to keep a war from, from spiraling to the kind of the very worst levels of violence.

I mean, World War II is in m- in most respects a total war, but the vast majority of other wars in human history have been limited, you know, whether because of the, the choice of the participants for some reason or another, 'cause they're pursuing political objectives and they have other interests in the world, or a lack of capacity.

In the context of China, the, uh, uh, there's these kind of old verities of limited war, but there's also a particularly important one, which is that both sides have, uh, what's called survivable nuclear arsenals, and in addition to nuclear arsenals, have enormous additional ways of hurting each other.

Is that an example of a li- of a limited war that, that the more powerful state lost? Uh, I'm, I'm talking beyond China now to what is possible in a conflict in Asia again.

Is NATO to get involved? Is that a factor for China?

Yeah, it's a factor.

I don't think Europe is gonna play a s- particularly significant role directly in the military balance in the Pacific.

Um, what I think the main role...

You know, Europe is the secondary theater for us.

It's, it's very important, but it's distinctly less important than Asia.

And furthermore, uh, the, the chance of a, of a s- of another state becoming or a state becoming hegemonic in that region is far less.

How would the coalition acquiring another nuclear power, Japan and Korea are two possibilities, how would that s- change the formula and would that successfully deny China its advantage?

How so?

Mm-hmm.

No.

I think you put your finger on it, John.

Right? The, the, the issue that Clausewitz, of course, was a master of is, is that, you know, the, the strength itself is not the only, uh, uh, sort of cr- factor that's relevant here.

The question is how much and how avidly are the combatants prepared to dedicate that, that, that amount of strength.

Right? The, the, the...

Is that correct?

What is to be done? Bridge, what is horizontal escalation? What is vertical escalation?

Horizontal escalation is basically the idea that instead of contesting the kind of, the direct battle that you're thinking about, so think Taiwan here or an earlier era, think of, say, Korea in 1950, instead you attack your enemy in, in some other geographic location or some other area that's not, you know, militarily connected to the direct theater.

So, you know, if we, uh, in, in the case of Taiwan, if we, let's say, attack the Chinese in Xinjiang or we attack their base in Djibouti.

Vertical escalation is basically increasing the intensity of the conflict.

So at the highest end it's the use of nuclear weapons at scale, but it could be, you know, terror bombing or large-scale conventional bombing or attacks, uh, designed to impose more cost and, and, and increase the intensity of conflict.

That is not easy for China to do, so would, would vertical escalation be more agreeable to China?

So, well, it depends on where...

So I think, I think...

What does that teach us about denial defense, Bridge?

Well, what it teaches us is that, um...

I think there- I found a- a great quote by- by, um, Air- Air Marshal Dowding to that exact point.

He said, "My goal here is not to defeat Germany and end the war, it's just to deny the invasion." It's a really good situation if you can arrange things such that, uh, our metric of success is essentially denial of the invasion, right? Because an invasion is really, really hard across water.

Now, it can be done.

We've been sailing all over the world for the last 70, 75 years and- and hav- certainly having the ability to invade people.

That's what our Marine Corps prepares to do, th- you know, the best of the best.

What does that mean, Bridge?

What advantage does that give them? What- what do- what does that mean for the coalition?

Right.

Exactly.

I think you put your finger on it, John.

That- that- that Beijing's strategic problem is, uh, to- to collapse the coalition without precipitating the very large war that would indubitably be very costly and risky and that they very well might lose, right? Normally being a Clausewitzian then in- in this context, the direct application of military force is the most attractive.

If you can just defeat your opponent, that's the best thing to do.

You know? As Napoleon said, "If you wanna take Vienna, take Vienna." That's your best option.

When the Chinese foray into the Taiwan Strait, when they send strategic bombers past- into the air- air defense identification zone of Taiwan, what are they using? What is that? Is that punishment? Is that fait accompli predicate? What- how do you view those- uh, those maneuvers, Bridge?

What does that mean?

Sure.

So, I mean, you've described very eloquently, John, you know, what the anti-hegemonic coalition is all about.

It's basically a classic balancing coalition.

Its exact form is ambiguous and inchoate and may never be formally, and may be overlapping, may be confused.

That's not the point.

But essentially a anti-hegemonic coalition just a description for states that are meaningfully acting in some way together to check China's dominance of the region.

What is the punishment tool? How does it work?

So in constructing that, is it appropriate for the US to have other filters for other countries in the coalition? Must those other countries be secure, free, and prosperous? Must they be democracies?

No, uh, actually not at all.

I mean, I think the goal of policy is to promote Americans' security, freedom, and prosperity, and that may require, um, uh, affiliating with countries that are not themselves, uh, republican systems, uh, like ours.

I mean, obviously, I think we all wish for c- uh, other countries to be governed in a, in a civilized and kind of, uh, liberal and, and republican way.

Um, but that's not the goal of American foreign policy, and I really try to root my argument.

Y- you know, one of the things that I've been very frustrated by over the last generation or so, I, I would say is that, um, American foreign policy discussion has become very attenuated in its connection to concrete American interests.

I mean, you know, we're talking here about a war with a- another superpower, the most powerful state to emerge in an international system, s- since the United States itself.

What is defensibility?

What is limited war and what does the US now know about its possible opponent China in a limited war? Good evening to you.

Good evening, John.

It's, it's wonderful to be back on with you.

It's a thanks for...

Uh, pleasure to be back on and, and an honor.

Um, what is a limited war? A limited war is something that sounds paradoxical but is very actually deeply rooted in basically human nature and certainly military affairs, which is the idea that, you know, even in wars that engage people's, you know, uh, deepest emotions and, uh, you know, aspirations and fears, there are al- almost always incentives to keep a war from, from spiraling to the kind of the very worst levels of violence.

I mean, World War II is in m- in most respects a total war but the vast majority of other wars in human history have been limited.

Is that an example of a li- of a limited war that, that the more powerful state lost? Uh, I'm, I'm talking beyond China now to what is possible in a conflict in Asia again.