Mm.

Uh, normalizing ties.

It's already obviously happened with, with Bahrain and, and the UAE in the context of the Abraham Accords.

I think that's gonna expand.

Um, I think you, we will be...

If, if Saudi Arabia has, had not, has not normalized with Israel- In five years, it will definitely be on a path towards normalization, and I think the Arab-Israeli conflict as we know it will basically be over.

And you will see-

Mm-hmm.

So how did you get into this? How did you start your podcast? What made you write these books about the wonders that Israel is doing and accomplishing? What was the start of all this?

Each of them is there is its own story, has its own origin story.

The short version is I've I've been involved with Jewish life and Israel and the U.S. Israel relationship for a long time.

I grew up with it.

My parents were very involved.

And then when I was working in politics and government, I worked a lot on foreign policy issues, so I was dealing a lot with Israel.

But the origin of the book of Startup Nation, which was the first time I was really out in a very public way under my own name, was that I had invested in a number of Israeli startups and worked with a number of Israeli entrepreneurs over the years.

right?

To understand the impact of the book, how would you define what Israel's image was for the global audience when you guys sat to write Startup Nation?

When we first thought about writing the book, we wrote it for two reasons.

One, we felt that there was this slice of Israeli life that most of the world, including most of the Jewish world, I should add, didn't know much about.

If you asked people who'd spent time in Israel or people who hadn't spent time in Israel what their image was of Israel and Israelis, you would get some version of soldiers, Haredim, ultra-Orthodox, or, like, the legacy of the founding kibbutz movement, you know, Israelis working in kibbutzim and moshavs, picking fruit.

Really, actually, there was some interesting polling done about this a number of years ago, what people's image was of Israelis.

And for Saul and me, both through the work he was doing writing at the time, he was working as a journalist in Israel, and I had invested in a number of Israeli startups, we knew all these Israeli entrepreneurs that we had worked with or he had written about, and we thought they were some of the most extraordinary people in the world.

You guys live and breathe this.

[laughs]

It's like-

Like being able to present in English, and communicate, and debate well over here, and, 'cause, 'cause many in the diaspora are making the case for Israel, or the case for the US-Israel relationship, and it's not helpful when you have Israeli leaders who undermine many of our efforts to make the case for this alliance.

And so, so what, one thing that has happened over the last, you know, 30 years or so is Netanyahu, love him or hate him, one thing he has done is he has upped the game on what's expected internationally of an Israeli prime minister in terms of their ability to speak En- English.

The truth is, he's an outlier, Netanyahu, in this sense.

If you think about Sharon, Ariel Sharon, someone I greatly admired, or Yitzhak Rabin, someone I greatly remi- admired, these were leaders who did not speak English well.

Yitzhak Shamir, another leader I, I greatly admired, didn't speak English well.

There are very few who communicate in English well.

Thirty-two is years ago.

Yeah.

I worked in the Bush administration for the Pentagon and the White House in 2003 and 2004, and I was based in Iraq for, and, and, and Doha and, and Kuwait for a little bit, but mostly Iraq for about 15 months, and then came back, uh, June, uh, 2004 when the US government handed, and the coalition handed sovereignty back to the Iraqis.

And I was back in the US.

I was living in New York.

I was work- I'd left the administration.

I was working, I was doing some media, a lot of media stuff around Iraq and what was going on in the Middle East, and I was doing some investing, some, uh, in, in the business world.

And then I also got this idea to write this, uh, book called, which became titled Start-Up Nation, which was based on two experiences.

Do you think it could come out today in like a major publishing house?

So, uh, Dan, thoughts on-

I mean, I'm, I've been asking this question if there is going to be, to folks in Washington and in Jerusalem, if there is gonna be military action, to do what? Like, to do what? I mean, I'm not, I'm certainly not opposed to it.

I just, but, but to do what? So, so you could say, you come up with probably three objectives.

One is trying to deal with the Strait of Hormuz.

So are we really sending in military assets and operations to r- to really try to, to wrestle back, uh, control of the strait? That's one.

Another could be just continue to do, to take, you know, weaken Iran's offensive capabilities.

You know, its missiles, its conventional capabilities, its missile production capacity, its industrial c- military industrial complex, whatever.

I, I think a key challenge.

If the, if there's a final agreement that involves the reliance on inspections to make sure that Iran doesn't begin to develop nuclear weapons, uh, continue to develop nuclear weapons, if it involves inspections and some level of trust on the Iranians to get rid of the current, um, uh, enriched uranium and plutonium, is Israel okay with that? Is Israel okay with a plan that involves the cooperation of the Iranians and trust, or would that cause a division between the United States and Israel?

I think, uh, Israel...

I mean, so there's two things going on.

One, w- whatever apprehension Israel has about the scenario that you just laid out, I don't think it will play out in public.

So I do believe there's a world in which, um, there may be disagreements that play out behind closed doors, but even still, I think Israel, while this, the scenario you just laid out is, is suboptimal, they could live to l- they could, they could learn to live with it, so long as they continue to have the capacity and the optionality and the flexibility to, as they say, uh, as the, a term they use in the region, mow, continue to mow the lawn.

So continue to, you know, engage in military kinetic operations that are not, like, big picture, lots of noise, lots of spectacle, but just engage in overt and covert military operations that continue to weaken the regime and keep the regime in check.

Um, I, I, I think one of the extraordinary gains from the last few weeks that really just b- it kind of blows my mind it doesn't get more attention, is because if, if, if you go back to, say, the 1990s, and when the Clinton administration was trying to figure out how to deal with North Korea and deal with North Korea's nuclear program, what many who worked in the Clinton administration and others will say is at some point, whatever options the United States had to deal with, to, to deal with North Korea and stop its nuclear program, at some point they lost their op- the US lost its o- optionality because North Korea had just built up a considerable conventional capability, which posed a threat in all sorts of directions, not the least of which to South Korea.

Mm-hmm

Um, what'd you hear today, uh, that perhaps moved the ball or, or, or not from the president?

I think the president is, as he's done since the war began, is maintaining his options, but it does feel to me, Mike, that we're headed into an escalatory mode here, simply because I think from Iran's perspective, from the regime's perspective, it's unlikely that they can agree to some kind of ceasefire that meets all the objectives that the administration is asking for, especially an open-ended ceasefire, which is what a, a 45-day ceasefire as Pakistan has proposed, uh, would basically amount to, given that it was in the context of negotiations that the US, I believe rightly, but the US did, uh, attack Iran and Israel attack Iran twice, uh, while there was some kind of conversation, some kind of dialogue going on back in June of, uh, 2025, and then just about five weeks ago.

Uh, the flip side is the administration can't agree to any kind of ceasefire or kind of interim, you know, set of attacks if at the core of them there is not a, a suspension, an outright end to Iran's nuclear program, its missile capabilities program, the industrial base that produces, uh, the missile capabilities.

So I do think we're, we're stuck here, and the president today is clearly, uh, escalating.

And I, and I think he'll follow through with it.

If it gets pushed off a day, another day, again, he always maintains his options, but it, it does seem just based on you look at the kinetic activity since the launch of Operation Epic Fu- Fury, that that is the path we're on.

I mean, there's a lot of this rhetoric out there that it seems like it's, it's, it's directed at a little bit, you know, beyond, uh, simply let's make sure that this threat is neutralized.

I think there is creative-Trial balloons being launched right now, some of which you heard in the press conference today, I think some of which we'll probably hear in the next few days, that relate to two areas.

So could you guys talk a little bit about what a mission accomplished, not necessarily in the Bush sense, but really a, a feeling of success for us looks like, and quiet those, I guess, who are saying or maybe amplify if, if that's what you agree with, those that are saying there is no way that we can actually degrade their capabilities, that this won't crop up again and will, this will have to be a recurring nightmare that we come back or they will, to your point, Dan, have these ballistic missile capabilities again in a year or two, and then, you know, we're back home and either have to go back or we leave our partners in the Gulf, um, with a huge mess again.

I think that the Israeli leadership and the American leadership have two different measures of what is success, Jess.

What should be the focus? Th- there is some overlap, but, but they do have two different measures of su- success, which is to say, I, I think Israel's experience is the Iran has been a menace to Israel, to the region, to the West, to the world, and there's no negotiating with this regime.

The regime has to go.

Now, what, how it goes and what replaces it is open for debate, and obviously is a, is a subject of discussion within the Israeli leadership, and the Israeli leadership is not explicitly saying success or failure is determined based on regime change, but that's effectively where they're at.

Whereas the American leadership, I think Trump in particular, is open to that if it doesn't require a long, drawn-out multi-month war.

He's also open to a version of Venezuela, right? Delsy Rodriguez.

Okay

So could you guys talk a little bit about what a mission accomplished, not necessarily in the Bush sense, but really a, a feeling of success for us looks like? And quiet those, I guess, who are saying, or maybe amplify if, if that's what you agree with, those that are saying there is no way that we can actually degrade their capabilities, that this won't crop up again, and will, this will have to be a recurring nightmare that we come back or they will, to your point, Dan, have these ballistic missile capabilities again in a year or two, and then, you know, we're back home and either have to go back or we leave our partners in the Gulf, um, with a huge mess again.

I think that the Israeli leadership and the American leadership have two different measures of what is success, Jess, what should be the focus.

Th- there is some overlap, but, but they do have two different measures of su- success, which is to say I, I think Israel's experience is the Iran has been a menace to Israel, to the region, to the West, to the world, and there's no negotiating with this regime.

The regime has to go.

Now, what, how it goes and what replaces it is open for debate, and obviously is a, is a subject of discussion within the Israeli leadership, and the Israeli leadership is not explicitly saying success or failure is determined based on regime change, but that's effectively where they're at.

Whereas the American leadership, I think Trump in particular, is open to that if it doesn't require a long, drawn-out multi-month war.

But he's also open to a version of Venezuela, right? Delsy Rodriguez.

Right

We wouldn't be surprised.

Right, we wouldn't be surprised.

So and then there'll be another leader, much like there-- So s- my, my only point is that the regime has been at this since 1979.They have invested heavily, not only in a deep bench for the leadership, but they've invested heavily in, in a security apparatus that is deeply loyal to the regime and to the revolution.

That is what the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is.

That's what the Basij security force is.

These are-- these, this is a, a massive security apparatus that involves hundreds of thousands of people.

But before you even get to, like, extended family of people connected to all those security per- p- uh, personnel who, yes, they had to be professional killers and professional interrogators and professional, um, uh, uh, terrorists almost.

One

Yeah.

... where the left is in terms of how advanced it is, meaning on how, the degree to which it's, it's really permeated the base of electoral politics.

And let, let me just spend a moment on that.

See, on, on the left right now, as you know, Marc, virtually anyone f- say, running for me- for Congress, save for maybe 15 or 20 seats in the country, the overwhelming majority c- of congressional districts in the country, they are either very red districts or very blue districts, and the incumbents in those seats are rarely worried about a general election challenge.

What they really live in fear of is a primary challenge.

And so if you are a Democrat today, I mean, take, you know, a race happening here in, in the New York City area where, where Dan Goldman is being...

Congressman Dan Golden, uh, Goldman is being challenged by Brad Lander.

Like, y- you could say not everything should be about Tucker, and you could say, "I know Tucker, he's not an anti-Semite." But isn't that, the silence around that, it's not total silence, people are quitting Heritage over it, but is the si- relative silence of the president and the vice president around that, isn't that something that if people just sit by and tolerate, you could say has contributed to a climate that's helping foster this?

Dan Senor is the host of the Call Me Back? podcast and author of The Genius of Israel.

It's open season.

This, at this point in history that you'd be looking at, you'd say this is open season on Jews, this must be coordinated in some way.

These things don't happen by accident.

All these things, all these events, all these horrible attacks on one demographic group happening almost in sequence? That, that, that just sort of happened, like that was just random, just random people taking matters into their own hands? Or, or was there something else going on? Now that, that something else could be many things.

We tend to think that antisemitism bursts out of a sense of chaos and it flourishes, it thrives, in moments of chaos.

And I think that's a real misunderstanding of what's going on, because you could look around you and you'd say, "Well, things aren't, there's not chaos.

I wonder what you make of such a question in light of the discussion we're having right now.

So from Hamas's perspective, why'd they sign in the line which is dotted here? Why now?

I think there are a few factors, some of which we know and some of which, some of which we will learn a lot in the weeks and months ahead, but here's what I think we know so far.

Uh, one, the decision by Israel, by the Israeli government, and I, and I wanna make this point very clear 'cause there's a distinction here.

The decision by the Israeli government to declare that it was going into Gaza City, I think history will look back at as a turning point.

Gaza City, which is, just for your listeners, it's a city inside Gaza, so it doesn't represent the entire Strip, the entire Gaza Strip.

It is one of the areas in Gaza that was largely, not entirely, but largely untouched during this entire war.

It is where most of the decision-makers for Hamas were based.

It's a reasonable question, right?

Uh, what did you think you were going to do with, with Call Me Back, and how has your life changed as a result of that day and that horror?

So, one, I, uh, my producer, Alon Ben-Dan and I, we never really had a conversation about it when we, when we started.

We had a podcast before October 7th, but on October 7th, we pivoted all the time to focusing on Israel, the Middle East, and the US, US foreign policy in the region.

And we just decided we were gonna provide voices largely, mostly, not entirely, but mostly from Israel, who can communicate well in Israel, who could explain what's going on and explain the, the dilemmas Israelis are dealing with as they figure out how to respond to the worst day for the Jewish people in a single day since the Holocaust, and, and the challenges Israel would face as it navigated this new world it was in.

And, and I didn't...

I wasn't focused on ideological, uh, um, you know, discipline.

I wasn't...

What's happened to you in two years?

Can you give us any nuance into over the last 30 or 15 days, w- how did this culminate into deal? Who were the parties? What were the pieces on the chess board? And what were the critical events and/or parties in bringing this deal to fruition?

I've been thinking about that a lot because I think there's a tendency, Scott, f- you know, what you do, and I do, and what a lot of other folks do in trying to make sense of moments in, in news cycles, and there's a tendency to, to, to just have these snap reactions to events, and snap analysis.

And we live in this moment where the moment there's, you know, one conversation that is reported out between two leaders, and then there's suddenly notifications out, then there's whole, you know, cycles of articles written about a tense conversation, or a good conversation, and, and trying to make sense of every minute, as opposed to taking a step back and sort of letting (laughs) events play out, and then try to, like, stitch them together.

And so, uh, when I think about some of the moments that occurred over the last, really, four weeks, four or five weeks, that there was this instant analysis and consensus on what they meant, and we now know it was all kinda wrong.

So I'm just gonna rattle off some of them 'cause it, it gets to the question you're asking.

So one was Israel's decision to go into Gaza City.

So, so, keep in mind, y- as you know, and as, I think, many of your listeners know, Gaza City was the last stronghold, the last Hamas strong- stronghold in Ga- in Gaza, sort of like Hamas' Berlin or Hamas' Moscow.

Talk about the governance in Israel, how this deal came about, what kind of pressure was applied, and what do you think this means for governance and specifically Netanyahu moving forward in Israel?

Did you ever foresee those countries putting the pressure on Hamas like that?

I think, uh, just to pivot off something Mark said, Brian, uh, once Hamas realized that the Israel and the IDF were not going to be restrained by the United States government...

Everyone tried to restrain Israel and its operations in Gaza.

The international community did.

You saw what Europe has been doing over the last few months.

The UN did.

The f- the previous administration tried to.

And I think that dichotomy shows as a reality on the ground, and these protestors don't even know what they're doing because they'd at least respond to the peace that's upon us.

Yeah

...

this day would come, which is if we spend two years, as you said, tolerating this rhetoric in the media, in social media, in college campuses, that Israel is a genocidal state and Israel's an apartheid state, and you're just indoctrinating, you know, lots of people, young people especially, but not only young people, across Europe and elsewhere, that this is a genocide and that these people, these Jews living in your midst, living in your society, are supporting this country and have a love for this country, Israel, then they are complicit in the genocide, then why wouldn't people start trying to kill the supporters of the genocide? I mean, it-- I, I hate to talk in such clinical terms, but it's actually quite logical that this would happen.

Unimaginable

...

it really is unimaginable.

And that's how he was talking.And then a couple weeks later, after that, there was a solidarity, the Jewish community in France held this solidarity march or solidarity event, similar to the one in November of '23 that was held in Washington, where in the US, something like 300,000 plus people came to the mall.

And so France had its own version of that, and they just assumed Macron would participate, and then he was a no-show.

... as his plan.

Look, I think that, uh, Israeli officials always believed, there was always enormous pressure inside Israel and from outside Israel, "Where's your day-after plan?" And Israeli officials argued, "If we present a day-after plan that's authored by us, it'll be, if, and it comes into, into Gaza on the back of an Israeli tank, it'll be immediately rejected.

It has to be an American plan backed by the Arab world, preferably backed by the Palestinian Authority, and that the Israelis could live with." And so, that's what this basically is.

But I should say, not only is it a win for Israel, and we can talk about why, but I do believe it's a win for the Palestinian people.

It gets them a, a, a Gaza that's not run by Hamas.

They're not to be terrorized by Hamas in this, if this deal is implemented.

They get an end to the war, and it's a win for the Arab world that's clearly behind it that wants to restore some kind of stability.

Yeah.

Yeah.

I didn't expect this to be the conversation.

Um, I, I think we should have a little bit more humility about what's possible and what's not possible, and just ask the question: if we wanna bring the temperature down between Israelis and Palestinians, whether they can get to a two state solution or not, the, the one sure thing we know we could do is try to create the conditions where that could possi- be possible some day.

And even along the way, it will improve the situation if, if the conditions are...

If both sides feel that they have some semblance of a home, they can live with some semblance of security and safety.

And I think right now, operating in a world in which the Palestinians are coming to believe that they're going to get a state while Hamas is holding hostages, while Hamas has arms, and while Hamas says it will do October 7th over and over and over again, is the opposite of creating the conditions where you can bring the temperature down.

And I think that is the, the folly, the catastrophe of what you're watching play out right now with all these European countries rallying, uh, that later this month at the UN to recognize a Palestinian state.

Uh, what is the strategic purpose at this point and, you know, w- where does it lead you?

Do you think they're ever gonna figure that out?

I, I...

You know, it's, it's really, um, it's really crazy.

I mean, I, I try to make the case for Israel and, and, and the importance of this alliance that the United States has with Israel often on American television.

When I do, I'm often quoted by anchors who are critical of Israel who cite Israelis who, um, usher th- who, who articulate the same criticisms that are being, that I'm being presented with to respond to.

And, um, and look, my response to you, Hugh, is on the one hand it's maddening, uh, when Yair Golani who's a former deputy chief of staff of the IDF, who's currently the leader of the Democrats Party in Israel, which is the far left party in Israel, he's been on my podcast, uh, smart guy, but, um, he said, he said about a month or two ago that, you know, Israel, the IDF is, is killing children, making a habit or a hobby or something of killing children.

Now, if he's in a future government, which is entirely possible, he could be serving in a, in a government that's, that's a successor to the Netanyahu-led government.

Uh, pick your order you wanna cover those two things, aware that we got five minutes or so.

The second I f- first heard the murmurs of it, I said, "Oh, here we go." Because a lot of people desperately want Trump to have a-

a-... mission accomplished embarrassment moment, uh, you know, like, uh, George W. Bush did.

Um, and, and they were gonna run with this thing for as long as they, as they could.

Um, I didn't...

You know, I, I was skeptical of it, but I had, I had no idea.

You know, I, I figured...

Cooler heads said there's a lot more information to come in, Wade.

Yeah.

Yes.

And Neil Ferguson, who basically said that there's no country in the last couple of hundred years you can point to that has faced the kind of threats Israel has faced and achieved the kind of geopolitical, um, I won't say hegemony, but definitely geopolitical strength that it's come out of in less, in such a short period of time, in about 19, 20 months.

That was about six, seven weeks ago.

I'd say in the last three weeks, it's gotten even better.

Here's what we know from Israel's perspective.

Uh, the biggest threat to Israel and to most of the Sunni Gulf, for that matter, most of the Middle East, was Iran.

It was the head of the snake.

Are you where I am on that?

The- the reason we're on the phone or doing this is, uh, A, we're friends and we go back, but Nadav Eyal was an Israeli journalist who was on your amazing, uh, podcast, Call Me Back, this morning, and I was so inspired by it that I thought, "Okay, I need- (laughs) I need Dan to come on and give us the cliff notes." Anyways, let's start with a summary of how, what's unfolded over the last, call it 48 hours.

Well, uh, on Thursday night our time, uh, about, you know, about somet- somewhere between 2:00 and 4:00, 1:00 and 4:00 AM, uh, Israel time, Israel launched a military operation.

And to- to call it a military operation understates it.

A military operation is what Israel did against Hezbollah with its pager attack and then systematically taking out the Hezbollah leadership.

Th- this was an operation in the context of a larger war, so this is- this is different than what Israel has dealt with i- over the last two years.

It launched a war, and we can get into what- what the significance of this being a war rather than just a military operation, but they launched, uh, what was the, let's say, the first phase of a war, which basically involved...

I mean, w- we still don't know all the details, but from what I know so far is the two most important elements, or say the three most important elements, were one, one, the Israeli Air Force deployed what sounds like close to the entirety of the Israeli Air Force.

But w- we're not looking for regime change, we're looking for you to step back, quite frankly, and dial down some of this rhetoric." Your thoughts?

And that you say there are ways in which the American Jewish community, in particular, can, um, find renewed purpose and meaning in the wake of this horror, and that there are signs that the community is not meeting the moment.

Yeah.

So, um, look, I...

When I was invited to give this address, I mean, Rabbi David Engber, who's the- who runs Jewish Life at the 92nd Street Y, who's the kind of architect of this, of this event, of this address, he just assumed I was gonna talk about Israel and geopolitics and what's happening and kind of mo- most of the topics I cover, you know, the kind of stuff I cover on, on my podcast.

And, um, I...

As, as we were getting closer and closer to the event, I, I just became increasingly of the view that Israel's gonna be okay.

Like, Israel's gonna be fine.

It's losing a generation and a generation.