And we both came to the conclusion,

someone at Rush should know how to do this.

You know, I feel like at a tertiary care center, one of the things that you do is you try new things.

And I think a lot of surgeons make... decisions about a new implant, a new technology, a new something without giving it a try.

And I think it's hard to intelligently talk about a topic unless you've at least tried it.

Hmm.

So the story is actually very funny.

We don't have to get into the science per se, but you having spent time creating expertise in this operation, what was it actually like practicing through that period? And did your patient conversations change during that time?

I guess, what are indications for constraint and how does Georgia's strategy or data change,

I guess, your view? Basically, what happened historically was we had just looked at our results of revising people for instability.

similar to you and you.

And then when we looked at our results, the majority of the failures were constrained liners.

And it was a combination of the really tough patients who were abductor deficient.

And as you both said, there's a mechanical problem with a constrained liner.

They just break over time.

You