Auguste Comte

a philosophy which no longer discussing the essence of things first causes the aim of life and similar symbolic expressions, and repudiating all sorts of anthropomorphism, the endowment of natural phenomena with human characteristics, should be a digest and unification of all our knowledge, a philosophy which, proceeding from the simple to the complex, would furnish a key to the understanding of all nature in its entirety, and through that, indicate to us the lines of further research and the means of discovering new yet unknown correlations so-called laws while at the same time it would inspire us with confidence in the correctness of our conclusions however much they may differ from current superstitions such attempts at a constructive synthetic philosophy were made several times during the nineteenth century the chief of them being those of auguste comte and of herbert spencer on these two we shall have to dwell The need of such a philosophy as this was admitted already in the 18th century by the philosopher and economist Turgeau, and subsequently, even more clearly, by Saint-Simon.

As has been stated above, the encyclopedists, and likewise Voltaire in his Philosophical Dictionary, had already begun to construct it.

In a more rigorous scientific form, which would satisfy the requirements of the exact sciences, it was now undertaken by Auguste Comte.

It is well known that Comte acquitted himself very ably of his task, so far as the exact sciences were concerned.

He was quite right in including the science of life, biology, and that of human societies, sociology, in the circle of sciences that compassed by his positive philosophy.

And his philosophy has had a great influence upon all scientists and philosophers of the 19th century.

But why was it that this great philosopher proved so weak the moment he took up, in his positive politics, the study of social institutions, especially those of modern times? This is the question which most admirers of Comte have asked themselves.

How could such a broad and strong mind come to the religion which Comte preached in those closing years of his life? Le Très and Mill, it is well known, refused even to recognize Comte's politics as part of his philosophy.

The attempt has often been made to classify these various faiths under some few general headings.

The scheme of Auguste Comte still has supporters.

He taught that man begins with fetishism, advances to polytheism, and at last rises to monotheism.

More in vogue at present is the theory that the simplest and lowest form of religion is individual.

A philosophy which, proceeding from the simple to the complex, would furnish a key to the understanding of all nature in its entirety, and through that, indicate to us the lines of further research and the means of discovering new, yet unknown correlations, so-called laws, while at the same time it would inspire us with confidence in the correctness of our conclusions, however much they may differ from current superstitions.

Such attempts at a constructive synthetic philosophy were made several times during the 19th century, the chief of them being those of Auguste Comte and of Herbert Spencer.

On these two we shall have to dwell.

The need of such a philosophy as this was admitted already in the 18th century by the philosopher and economist Turgot, and subsequently, even more clearly, by Saint-Simon.

As has been stated above, the encyclopedists, and likewise Voltaire in his philosophical dictionary, had already begun to construct it.

In a more rigorous scientific form, which would satisfy the requirements of the exact sciences, it was now undertaken by Auguste Comte.

It is well known that Comte acquitted himself very ably of his task so far as the exact sciences were concerned.

He was quite right in including the science of life, biology, and that of human societies, sociology, in the circle of sciences that compassed by his positive philosophy.

It was The Count of Monte Cristo, Dumas' terrible romance.

My civilized fool read everything, beginning with the signboards of the public houses and finishing with Auguste Comte, which was lying in my trunk together with other neglected books that I did not read.

But of the whole mass of written and printed matter, he only approved of terrible, strongly exciting novels with celebrated personages, poison, and subterranean passages.

All the rest he dubbed nonsense.

He has made his impress on eternity.

Opinions may differ as to what constitutes Harriet Martineau's best work, but my view is that her translation and condensation of Augustus Comte's six volumes into two will live when all her other work is forgotten.

Comte's own writings were filled with many repetitions and rhetorical flourishings.

He was more of a philosopher than a writer.

He had an idea too big for him to express, but he expressed it right bravely.

She caught the idea and translated the thought rather than the language.

And so it has come about that her work has been literally translated back into French and is accepted as a textbook of positivism, while the original works of the philosopher are merely collected by museums and bibliophiles as curiosities.

Comte taught that man passes through three distinct mental stages in his development.