Army Group B

The German command is at first as confused as the British.

In the early hours, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps informs Heeresgruppe B that the Arnhem Road bridge has been cleared and is passable.

The report is corrected, but it puts British strength at only 120 men.

At 0400, SS-Hauptsturmführer Heinrich Brinkmann, charged with clearing the bridge, receives his first reinforcements from Wehrkreis IV.

Paulus' current forces were insufficient for the task assigned to them.

A significant number of officers throughout the Sixth Army and Army Group B began to voice alternative proposals.

Perhaps they suggested cautiously quickly establishing winter positions and holding what had already been captured would be preferable to grinding attritional warfare that had consumed thousands of lives.

The Heer Operations Department, particularly that of Colonel Adolf Huessinger and his planners, supported this view.

October the sixth, Hitler delivered his judgment from his Wolf's Lair, where he spent the majority of his time during this period.

His decision would seal the fate of millions.

The complete occupation of Stalingrad, he proclaimed, was the most important task facing Army Group B.

All other considerations, all other operations, all strategic calculations were now secondary to that objective.

Zeebrecht pulls back and radios the news to SS-Obersturmbannführer Petsch at the headquarters of the 10th SS-Panzer Division.

Petsch passes it to the Corps and to Heeresgruppe B.

The next arrival shows what the missing southern end will cost.

SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Euling's battalion of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 22 has been reinforced with SS-Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 10 and re-designated Kampfgruppe Euling.

He was shocked at the poor state of the defenses and argued for more men and material to shore up the coastline.

In January 1944, Rommel was given command of Army Group B, defending northern France and the low countries.

Over the next four months, Rommel tirelessly dedicated himself to improving the Atlantic Wall before the expected invasion.

It wasn't just the beach fortifications that upset Rommel.

To say that the Fuhrer himself was a handicap to Germany's war aspirations was, on so many levels, a massive understatement.

With a compromise that pleased neither commander, it was guaranteed that there would be neither enough concentration of force for Rundstedt's powerful Panzer counterattack, nor enough flexibility of command for Rommel's strategy of forward defense.

The subordinates that the Fuhrer had placed under Rommel's command ensured his Army Group B would be doomed as soon as the Allies set foot on the continent.

This is Dr. Klaus-Jürgen Bremm, historian and author of Normandy 1944: The Decisive Battle for Europe.