Anti-German sentiment

It had been founded initially as a monastic institution in the 14th century.

It... by the 20th century, particularly, you know, this was kind of the, this kind of the peak of the progressive era, like a tail end in the UK, um, like public secondary school, it'd be kind of become this like revered ideal, you know, and it was part of that was, uh, despite, uh, You know, from the Disraeli from Disraeli's tenure on or Disraeli himself was in particularly Germanophobic.

But from that period onward, there was this tendency to talk about, you know, the Kaiser Reich like it was lacking in every way compared to the UK.

in cultural terms, you know, there was a suggestion it was actually culturally impoverished.

And I'll get into why in a minute.

Bismarck was never able to realize that, but what he did do The establishment of what was called the Mediterranean Agreements, the practical effect was creating an adjacent security concord with the UK, okay? And that, coupled with the reinsurance treaty with Russia when it was in effect, that had the effect of freezing France out of any potential anti-German coalition.

Because for it to attempt to develop such a competing alliance, like any potential party signatories, it would be in direct violation and frustration of purpose of the express conditions of a treaty that was in effect with Germany.

And in material terms, it would be self-defeating in various ways.

But, um, be as it may, um, it, uh, France came out a big winner in Indochina owing to British concessions and basically like London was able to buy, buy French goodwill in that way.

Okay? Um, but I mean at the same-- So I mean these, um, what, what became the Entente Cordiale, uh, I'm sure I butchered that as the French called it in 1904.

This wasn't primarily like an anti-German agreement.

Like, I mean, the French base-- And the French realized that, I mean, uh, for, for the preceding, you know, for the, for the preceding millennia, I mean, it was, they were intermittently at war with, with Britain.

He said, quote, or the Balkans are, quote, "Not worth the healthy bones of one Pomeranian musketeer." Now, that was not realistic, but the appearance of balanced diplomacy was maintained, and that was what was key, okay? He didn't issue some belligerent statement, you know, saying that there's a line in the sand, and if any dirty slob crosses it, you know, into Croatia or, you know, across the or becomes within sight of the Bosnian frontier, you know, like we're going to, you know, we're going to go to war to, you know, defend our Volkswagens in the Habsburg Empire.

So, I mean, again, like he was the point the point is not the merit of that statement or realistic that statement was it was what was he telegraphing the Russians and the British for that matter too the British interest in the in the Balkans is is obviously totally different than they are the Russians but if you can't move in the Balkans you you can't dominate the Mediterranean but another another big coup when the Russians went to war with the Ottomans 1877 78 that that triggered a major international crisis which on the one hand was remote from Europe in terms of the theater in which it occurred but Europe was impacted in power political terms directly and indirectly in all kinds of ways Bismarck insinuated himself as a mediator over the post-war settlement and he made absolutely no he sought no direct concessions for Germany and he became hailed as this great kind of like man of peace you know like it was a he telegraphed essentially that European peace and German security were synonymous like and again this was a perception whether you believe it or not it's not important like people kind of accepted not kind of people did accept this this view you know that's how they read that's how they read the outcome as having developed okay and this was possible because again by the end the by the last three years of Bismarck's tenure 1887 to 1890 Germany was tied by express agreements of one form or another you know whether they were you know direct military treaties or whether they were you know treaties facilitating deep interdependence on trade or whether they were you know agreements declaring maritime rights Germany was tied one way or another to virtually every continental power the triple most significantly of this era was a triple alliance between Germany Austria-Hungary and Italy it was a it was codified on May 20th 1882 it provided that Germany and the Habsburg Empire would resist Italy if it was attacked by France quote without provocation in turn Italy would assist Germany if if attacked by France and in the event of a war between the Habsburg Empire and Russia Italy declared neutrality now the ultimate ambition of this Bismarck's ambition was to bring the UK into this triple alliance okay and that always that that always was the intended master stroke of German diplomacy that's what Ribbentrop was trying to accomplish decades later okay and that was that wasn't outlandish and I'll get into why in a minute Bismarck was never able to realize that but what he did do the establishment of what was called the Mediterranean agreements the practical effect was creating an adjacent security concord With the UK, okay? And that coupled with the reinsurance treaty with Russia, when it was in effect, that had the effect of freezing France out of any potential anti-German coalition.

Because for it to attempt to develop such a competing alliance, like any potential party signatories, it would be a direct violation and frustration of purpose of the express conditions of a treaty that was in effect with Germany.

And in material terms, it would be self-defeating in various ways, you know, owing to the underlying catalyst for these treaties with those countries that had provided them tangible benefits.