Skip to main content
Anatoli Dobrynin

Anatoli Dobrynin

Statesman and diplomatWikipedia

Search complete. 26 mentions across 9 episodes found for "Anatoli Dobrynin".

Oct 20, 2026

Fredrik LogevallGUEST
25:53
And then finally, when even that method didn't seem quite to give the kind of urgency or that there was a kind of stalemate, you have the back channel.
Fredrik LogevallGUEST
26:03
which is direct interactions between, in particular here, Robert Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, in the climactic days of the crisis, where they could actually communicate face-to-face.
Jane PerlezHOST
26:17
So Robert Kennedy would go over to the Soviet embassy in Washington on 16th Street, and they would discuss it, and then Drabinin would get on the telephone to Moscow? I'm not actually
Fredrik LogevallGUEST
26:27
quite sure yet, but certainly he did get the word immediately to Moscow.
speaker_2NARRATOR
7:16
Soviet participation, the Office of the Historian explains, was doomed because Stalin would not open his closed society to Westerners.
speaker_2NARRATOR
7:24
A report from the American ambassador in Prague records Czechoslovak leaders being told that taking part would be an act aimed against the Soviet Union, and their cabinet withdrew its acceptance.
speaker_2NARRATOR
7:34
In 1950, a poster contest drew more than ten thousand entries.
speaker_2NARRATOR
7:39
The winner showed a single ship whose sails were made from every country's flag.

37 MINS LATER

speaker_2NARRATOR
44:43
From quiet men with books, we turn to a quiet object hanging on a wall.
speaker_2NARRATOR
44:48
5.3.
speaker_2NARRATOR
44:51
In 1945, a group of Soviet schoolchildren presented a gift to the American ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman.
speaker_2NARRATOR
44:59
It was a hand-carved wooden version of the Great Seal of the United States.
Vince HoughtonGUEST
14:54
So the vast majority of people who had been trying to leave were not allowed to and had gotten to the point where it was impossible.
Vince HoughtonGUEST
15:01
And Anatoly Dobrynin, who was the longtime ambassador to the United States of the Soviet Union, actually in his book quips that it would be easier to become a cosmonaut in the Soviet Union then to leave as a refusenik because more people percentage-wise were qualifying for cosmonaut training than refuseniks being allowed to leave the Soviet Union.
Vince HoughtonGUEST
15:22
That gives you an idea of why what people were doing was so important because you had to figure out a way to do it.
Vince HoughtonGUEST
15:29
They're not going to be able to do it on their own.
Gurnel ScottCORRESPONDENT
10:26
There were a lot of conversations that went on, uh, as this, as these 13 days played out.
Gurnel ScottCORRESPONDENT
10:32
And, uh, the attorney general at the time, uh, Robert F. Kennedy, had some conversations with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador at the time.
Gurnel ScottCORRESPONDENT
10:42
Talk to me a little bit about what we know about those conversations and how it played into how we navigated this very tenuous time.
Graham AllisonGUEST
10:51
A very good point, and a very important point t- both for the details and the generic.
Graham AllisonGUEST
10:58
So people misunderstand how important private, candid communications can be.
Graham AllisonGUEST
11:04
Now, private, candid communications can include people misleading each other, as indeed Khrushchev had done about the fact that he was gonna install missiles in Cuba.
Graham AllisonGUEST
11:15
On the other hand, the private channel that was established between his brother, who also happened to be the attorney general, and Dobrynin, the long-term serv- serving, uh, Soviet ambassador in, in Moscow, were essential in ultimately resolving the crisis.
Graham AllisonGUEST
11:33
So I had the good fortune when I was writing my book to interview at length both Bobby Kennedy and, uh, Dobrynin.
Izabella TabarovskyGUEST
34:04
They're tasking their advisors with communicating these anti-Zionist ideas to the political classes that they interact with.
Izabella TabarovskyGUEST
34:12
There is this really incredible correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin from 1970, where he is being told, go and speak to everybody who will listen to you on the Hill Go and speak to progressive Jews and tell them how dangerous Zionism is.
Izabella TabarovskyGUEST
34:36
Go and talk to non-Jews and tell them that Zionists are undermining the prospects for peace between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Izabella TabarovskyGUEST
34:46
So there is that component.
Dan SnowHOST
49:29
He's gonna home in on that first letter that Khrushchev sent saying that he would back down in return for a non-invasion of Cuba pledge.
Dan SnowHOST
49:37
And so that very same night, that very same night, while submarine B-59 and its American pursuers are tiptoeing around nuclear catastrophe, JFK sends his brother, Robert Kennedy, to meet the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin.
Dan SnowHOST
49:55
They were alone.
Dan SnowHOST
49:56
It was a private meeting.
Dan SnowHOST
49:58
The Soviet ambassador later reports that Bobby Kennedy was deeply stressed.
Dan SnowHOST
50:03
Bobby Kennedy states unambiguously that the Soviets had to agree to remove those missiles within 24 hours, or the US would invade Cuba.
Dan SnowHOST
50:13
Now, between themselves, RFK, Bobby Kennedy, is saying, "There's a bonus.
Dan SnowHOST
50:19
We will give you a concession.
Dan SnowHOST
49:01
He's going to ignore Khrushchev's harsh language, bellicose language, he's going to home in on that first letter that Khrushchev sent saying that he would back down in return for a non-invasion of Cuba pledge.
Dan SnowHOST
49:17
And so that very same night, that very same night, while submarine B-59 and its American pursuers are tiptoeing around nuclear catastrophe, JFK sends his brother, Robert Kennedy, to meet the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin.
Dan SnowHOST
49:35
They were alone.
Dan SnowHOST
49:36
It was a private meeting.
William CooperHOST
18:34
especially its important agents of influence among politicians, businessmen, scientists, and of course, Western journalists.
William CooperHOST
18:45
Anatoly Golitsyn prepared a special memorandum on Anatoly Dobrynin for the CIA which confirmed Dobrynin's use of KGB agents along strategic lines.
William CooperHOST
18:57
The late Mr. James Angleton concluded that the memorandum should be published in declassified form in order to neutralize Dobrynin's political influence in Washington and have him expelled for interference in the internal affairs of the United States.
William CooperHOST
19:14
The findings of the memorandum were, however, disregarded after the Watergate hearings which destabilized the American intelligence and counterintelligence services.

1 more episode mentions Anatoli Dobrynin.

Create an account to see the whole feed, search across every transcript, and follow the entities you care about.

We value your privacy

We use cookies to understand how you use our platform and to improve your experience. Click “Accept All” to consent, or “Decline non-essential” to opt out of non-essential cookies. Read our Privacy Policy.