AGM-158C LRASM

They've got some theater nuclear capabilities, and other than the 76-2, we've got nothing.

And to me, that's an enormous amount of strategic risk that we somehow are blithely accepting as a nation and say, well, we can't put a W80 on an LRASM because, you know, it's going to create all these problems.

You know, how will the adversary differentiate between a nuclear or a conventional LRASM? or taking just a normal TLAM and slapping a W80 on the TLAM and putting on some Virginias at sea next year, which we could do.

And the Navy says, well, it's really hard and it's a pain to have nuclear weapons on an attack submarine.

Okay, well, again, we're accepting tremendous amounts of strategic risk because some sailors think that nuclear weapons are hard.

It's also getting long-range weapons, you know, like the AIM-174B long-range air-to-air missile.

the new AIM-424 Malus, another very long-range airdrop missile, LRASM, which is a long-range anti-ship missile, and more recently, the Blackbird hypersonic weapon.

And also, too, the Navy is going to be getting the MQ-24 refueler, and this is going to be helping the Super Hornets and the F-35Cs extend their combat radius off the carrier.

But ultimately, the Super Hornet is a 1990s design.

Some of them quite high cost.

I'm thinking, for example, in the Pacific arena, like your long-range anti-ship missiles, your LRASMs, which are somewhere between two and three million a missile, useful if you're pushed pretty far back beyond the first and even the second island chains.

Certainly we see some exquisite systems on the defensive side as well with Patriots or THAAD interceptors.

There's been a lot of talk about high-low mixes.