Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.

What I'm concerned about that this report really kind of opened my eyes to is that, you know, if a If a container's true origin can be disguised well enough to dodge a tariff, couldn't that same trick hide something like a compromised computer chip with malicious code baked in, shipped through a third country, and installed into our power grid or military equipment? And it's not a hypothetical because I'll give a perfect example.

In Canada, Chinese-built cranes from a company called ZPMC, they run the ports of Vancouver, Halifax, Prince Rupert, and investigators have already found unexplained components in similar Chinese-built cranes that were bound for US ports.

Yeah.

And then to your point, which you were mentioning earlier too in the case of Mexico, Chinese-linked port terminals have reportedly moved the precursor chemicals behind the fentanyl crisis.

Part of our analysis when we covered that was that not only could they force the trucks to shut down, they could also use the network devices in the trucks as nodes for further cyber attacks against the U.S. logistics network.

There's also the issue of the ZPMC-made port cranes.

It's a Chinese company that produces 80%.

They have an 80% market share in the global market for the largest types of cargo cranes at ports around the globe, including the United States.

There are multiple threats here where these could all be used as nodes to target U.S. ports.

And as far as I'm aware, the Defense Logistics Agency about a year ago at least, about two years ago at least, was looking at the ZPMC crane issue.

I'm not aware of any other federal agency work on that sense or on this issue, but I do think that this presents a novel threat from four cyber attacks targeting US logistics.

Well, you know, talking about U.S. logistics and trucking, I just want to give a quick preview to our audience that we are developing a story right now.